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of enlargement increase the need to deepen the reforms of the Union's agricultural policies, as
set out in Agenda 2000. The outcomes of negotiation rounds such as WTO trade negotiations
and the Kyoto environmental summit bear implications for European farmers, related supply-
ing and processing industries and European consumers. The assessment of likely policy
impact is bound to be complex and should be supported by quantitative modelling analysis
that explicit the relations of European countries with third countries. The applications reported
here all utilise the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model as a starting point and tailor
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7Preface
The prospect of a new round of trade negotiations and the perspective of enlargement increase
the need to deepen the reforms of the Union's agricultural policies, as set out in Agenda 2000.
The outcomes of negotiation rounds such as WTO trade negotiations and the Kyoto environ-
mental summit bear implications for European farmers, related supplying and processing
industries and European consumers. The assessment of likely policy impact is bound to be
complex and should be supported by quantitative modelling analysis that explicit the relations
of European countries with third countries.
On September 21, 2000, the Tinbergen Institute of Erasmus University Rotterdam and
LEI, the Dutch Research Institute of Social Sciences for Food and Natural Resources, jointly
hosted a workshop in Rotterdam, where applications of the Global Trade Analysis Project
(GTAP) framework to European policy issues were discussed. The workshop was part of
larger concerted action project which was financially support by the European Commisison
under the FAIR-6 and INCO programmes. The GTAP-EU concerted action involves a large
number of researchers from European countries and aims at assessing the usefulness of the
GTAP framework for European policy issues. The concerted action, and this report, are spe-
cifically zooming in on enlargement of the European Union with Central and East European
countries, WTO multilateral trade liberalisation negotiations, reforms of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy and environmental issues.
The Managing Director,
Prof. Dr. L.C. Zachariasse
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9Summary
This report contains four papers which discuss applications of the GTAP model to some of the
most pressing policy issues confronting the agricultural sector of the European Union. The ap-
plications are meant to be illustrative, in the sense that they highlight the possibilities of the
GTAP framework to be adapted to policy questions. By the same token, the papers in this vol-
ume highlight also the needs for further research.
The first paper concerns the analysis of economic impacts of the enlargement of the
European Union, with special emphasis on the role of direct payments to farmers.
The second paper concerns the modelling the impact of WTO negotiations on EU agri-
culture.
The third paper treats the interactions between the recent EU Agenda 2000 CAP reform,
world prices and URAA GATT-WTO export constraints, and the
last paper treats transnational environmental issues by discussing the economic effects of an
unilateral or harmonised tax on fertiliser and pesticide use in EU agriculture.
The GTAP database and its associated modelling efforts represent a major achievement
for advancing quantitative analysis of international trade, resource and environmental issues.
The demonstrative applications contained in this report show that the GTAP framework is
easily adaptable to specific policy questions which center around the multi-country trade re-
lated issues. The applications also highlight the usefulness of a multi-sector general
equilibrium approach for policy analysis, where indirect effects of policy changes in one sec-
tor of the economy trigger resource movements and reallocations within the entire economy.
Such indirect effects propagate through markets for land and labour production factors as well
as through markest for final products.
Although the GTAP framework is rather flexible, the applications in this volume clearly
show that specific policy questions require additional efforts. All of the applications have en-
gaged in the collection of additional data, which are either folded into the standard GTAP
dataset to improve the representation of policy instruments, or are used to supplement the
GTAP data for ex-post calculations. It is the area of database construction where we foresee
the greatest benefits from future collaborations amongst researchers, both within the EU as




On September 21, 2000, the Tinbergen Institute of Erasmus University Rotterdam and LEI,
the Dutch Research Institute of Social Sciences for Food and Natural Resources, jointly hosted
a workshop in Rotterdam, where applications of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
framework to European policy issues were discussed. The workshop was part of a larger con-
certed action project which involves a large number of researchers from European countries
and aims at assessing the usefulness of the GTAP framework for European policy issues 1. An
earlier workshop, which was held in Copenhagen, and hosted by the Danish Institute of Agri-
cultural and Fisheries Economics, resulted in a companion volume of workshop proceedings
(Frandsen and Stæhr, 2000). The Copenhagen workshop aimed at an assessment of the usabil-
ity of GTAP for important policy issues, with a focus on the theoretical elements as well as the
empirical database. The current volume contains four papers, which discuss applications of the
GTAP model to some of the most pressing policy issues confronting the agricultural sector of
the European Union:
(I) Enlargement of the European Union.
(II) Impact of global trade issues such as the WTO trade liberalisation negotiations for the
European Union.
(III) Impacts of Common Agricultural Policy reforms on member countries and third coun-
tries.
(IV) Analysis of environmental issues in a multi-region context.
The applications are meant to be illustrative, in the sense that they highlight the possi-
bilities of the GTAP framework to be adapted to policy questions. By the same token, the
papers in this volume also highlight the needs for further research.
What is GTAP?
GTAP was initiated in the early 1990s with the goal of supporting high level quantitative
analysis of international trade, resource, and environmental issues in an economy wide con-
text. The GTAP project is supported by leading international agencies in trade and
development policy, as well as a number of national agencies with active research pro-
                                                
1 This report has been financially supported by the European Commission under the FAIR-6 and INCO pro-
grammes (FAIR6 CT 98-4148) in the framework of the GTAP-EU concerted action. The content of this report is
the sole responsibility of the authors and does not in any way represent the views of the European Commission or
its services. For inquiries about the concerted action, please contact the co-ordinator: f.w.vantongeren@lei.wag-
ur.nl.
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grammes on these issues. The GTAP headquarters are at Purdue University under the director-
ship of Professor Thomas Hertel 1. The project develops and maintains a global database, a
multi-region multi-sector general equilibrium model and provides training courses 2. All of
these visible products are publicly available at modest cost.
There are basically two strands of quantitative modelling in policy analysis. One ap-
proach is to build issue-specific models, depending on the question at hand. These models will
usually be capable of capturing many relevant aspects of one specific policy question, but are
of less use in a different policy context. The other approach sets out to construct more general
and flexible models, which do not necessarily attempt to capture all detail but are flexible
enough to allow elaboration in face of specific policy questions. (for a deeper discussion of
these methodological issues, see Van Tongeren, Van Meijl and Surry, 2001). Such a model-
ling framework is provided by the GTAP framework. The standard GTAP model is a multi-
region, computable general equilibrium model, with perfect competition and constant returns
to scale. Adaptations of the standard model have been developed by various GTAP users.
Such elaborations, include increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition, international
knowledge spillovers, dynamic equilibrium formulations and incorporation of non-continuous
policy instruments such as formulated in GATT commitments.
Applications
The applications found in this report are adaptations of the standard GTAP model to specific
European policy questions. The first paper by Frandsen and Jensen concerns the analysis of
economic impacts of the enlargement of the European Union, with special emphasis on the
role of direct payments to farmers. This paper addresses this issue from an economy-wide per-
spective, and develops three enlargement scenarios ranging from a situation where no direct
subsidies are given to the new member countries to a scenario where the farmers in the new
member states are given the same level of direct payments as under the existing CAP. A third
scenario analyses the effects of reducing the direct payment to two thirds of the existing level
in all current and new member countries.
The analyses illustrates that the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)
clearly have a solid potential for increasing their production of agricultural commodities. The
extent to which direct payments are applied will affect the supply response in the CEECs. It is
shown that the major force behind the significant crop supply response is due to large shifts in
the use of agricultural land. An overall welfare economic analysis shows that enlarging the
Union leads in all scenarios to only small economic welfare losses in 'old' member states in
spite of relative large increases in 'old' member states net contributions. The analysis also il-
lustrates that enlarging the EU with the existing CAP is an expensive option in budgetary
                                                
1 For more information on the GTAP organisation see: http://www.gtap.org/.
2 At the time of writing, version 4 is the latest version that is publicly released (publicly released in April of
1998); it has 45 Regions and 50 sectors and takes 1995 as its base year. Version 5 GTAP database is scheduled
for public release in 2001. All applications reported in this report use version 4 data.
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terms as the level of CAP related expenditures could increase by one third thereby exceeding
the constraints laid down in the EU 'Financial Perspectives'.
The workshop discussions on the paper by Frandsen and Jensen clearly showed the
benefits of using an economy-wide framework in the analysis of EU enlargement. While par-
tial models, and direct impact calculations may be very well suited to make a first round
assessment of the expected amounts of monetary transfers from 'old' to 'new' member states if
some form of the CAP is applied in the CEECs, their use is limited when it comes to signifi-
cant resource shifts between alternative uses. Such is certainly the case in CEECs, where
agriculture forms a large share in the total economy. Accession to the European Union leads to
changes in economic incentives, and reallocations within the enlarged EU can be expected to
be guided by comparative advantage. A general equilibrium framework, such as GTAP, which
takes explicitly the economy-wide resource constraints into account is the appropriate frame-
work to study the medium- to long term impacts. While the GTAP framework has a clear
contribution in highlighting such indirect effects, it should also be recognised that this is to
some extent complementary to partial models of EU agriculture as regards the modelling of
some of the details of the CAP, such as for example intervention stocks, the phasing of policy
instruments, and the modelling of structural measures under the CAP.
The second paper by Joseph Francois concerns modelling the impact of WTO negotia-
tions on EU agriculture. This application of the GTAP model uses a modified version of the
GTAP model and dataset to examine the impact of a new set of multilateral agriculture nego-
tiations, for EU agriculture, but also more broadly for the European Union and for its trading
partners. Negotiations in agriculture and services under the aegis of the WTO are supposed to
be undertaken anyway as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements. However, it is not clear if
these negotiations will remain sectoral efforts, or if they might eventually be subsumed as part
of a broader effort aimed at goods and services. The aim of this paper is to use the model to
shed some light on possible implications of future multilateral agriculture liberalisation, both
for the EU and other developed WTO Members, and also for developing countries. The paper
starts by revisiting the Uruguay Round (UR), which will not be fully implemented until 2005.
The paper zooms in on the scope for market access negotiations in the next multilateral trade
round, and how they will be shaped by the results of the last one. This includes a discussion of
tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) and related agricultural policy issues. Finally, the model is applied to
examine the impact of multilateral liberalisation in agriculture on European agriculture and the
EU economy more broadly defined.
Generally, for output levels, it does not matter much whether or not liberalisation takes
place in the context of other negotiations. The output responses are roughly comparable, with
rice, sugars, and natural fibres being the most sensitive in terms of output levels. Domestic
prices display more significant differences between scenarios, with the direction of price
changes depending for both oilseeds and vegetables on the scope of the scenario. Signifi-
cantly, all negative pressures on EU agricultural prices are moderated in the context of broad
liberalisation. With broad liberalisation, increased incomes exert enough pressure to pull
prices up somewhat from the depressed levels that follow from agriculture-only liberalisation.
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This suggests that price support schemes could be more easily maintained under a broad
liberalisation, because of income-demand linkages. It is the developing countries in particular
that have been vocal about their opposition to further trade-liberalisation efforts. For example,
the poorest countries have expressed genuine concern that further agriculture negotiations will
lead to an erosion in their real incomes. The analysis shows that the narrow liberalisation sce-
narios, lead to net welfare losses for poor regions in the world. These results are reversed,
qualitatively, once we move to a broad round. Yes, we can expect losers from agricultural lib-
eralisation, particularly in the world's poorest countries. However, this is more than
compensated for if liberalisation is expanded to include manufactures and services.
The discussions following the paper concentrated on the thorny issue of modelling
TRQs. In an aggregative global model like GTAP one inevitable loses some product detail,
and this hampers the modelling of TRQs which are typically implemented at a very disaggre-
gated commodity level. This is illustrated in the paper for the case of EU dairy quota, where
quota may be binding for some types of cheese and not for others. Aggregation in this case is
bound to lead to loss of insights. This is all the more the case if quota are allocated bilaterally.
It was noted that the modelling of the other famous quota regime, the multi-fibre-agreement,
does not suffer from such problems.
The discussions also highlighted the importance to incorporate existing preferential trade
agreements correctly into the base data. A multilateral reduction of MFN tariffs is bound to
erode existing preferences that for example the EU grants to the so called ACP countries. The
erosion of current preferences is of concern to some developing countries and will influence
their negotiation positions in the current WTO round.
The paper by Van Meijl and Van Tongeren treats the interactions between the recent EU
Agenda 2000 CAP reform, world prices and URAA GATT-WTO export constraints. The Uru-
guay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) in 1994 had a major impact on the EU's CAP
policy, as domestic farm policies have become subject to international governance through the
GATT. The set of rules established under the GATT limits the scope for domestic agricultural-
and trade policies. The constraints on the value of export subsidy expenditures and on the vol-
ume of subsidised exports are expected to become most pressing. Binding constraints on
export subsidies imply that insulation of EU markets from world markets is more difficult be-
cause some excess supply cannot be disposed on world markets at reduced prices. This paper
discusses whether and to what extent the Agenda 2000 reform package of the CAP contributes
to fulfilment of the EU's commitments on reduction of export subsidies made under the earlier
URAA. They use a modified version of the GTAP model that includes the EU's price insula-
tion mechanism from world markets. They introduce new equations and new variables to
represent the EU's price insulation from world markets, and they include an explicit modelling
of intervention (floor) prices. They also introduce set-aside rates in the EU's cereal sectors and
a milk production quota system in the EU's dairy sector. Like the Frandsen and Jensen paper,
they make some modifications to the database in order to achieve an improved representation
of compensation payments. The paper shows that Agenda 2000 contributes to the alleviation
of the export subsidy commitments, but not to alleviation of the export volume constraints.
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Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis with respect to international grains markets shows
that the export subsidy bindings are dependent on the situation on the world market. The re-
sults clearly point out that the development of international markets is important for the
bindings of export subsidy constraints. The authors consider the endogeneity of world prices
in the GTAP model to be a major advantage in this regard.
In the discussions it was pointed out that the results of this exercise are extremely sensi-
tive to the base year employed. For example, the 1995 base year was characterised by
exceptionally high world grain prices, which led to historically low values of EU export subsi-
dies. Instead of using a fixed historical base year, it has been suggested to construct a
'representative' starting point for the simulations in order to iron out the specifics of a particu-
lar year.
Discussants were also concerned about the fact that the modelling of the CAP differed in
some respects between the Frandsen/Jensen paper and the Van Meijl/Van Tongeren paper.
While it is certainly desirable to achieve a common basis of modelling the CAP, the authors
pointed out that a completely uniform treatment of the policies may be to restrictive. It de-
pends on the specific issue at hand which elaborations on the common basis are endeavoured.
The advantage of the GTAP framework is precisely that it creates a common starting point in
model formulation and in data collection. Specific elaborations and model specifications
which are tailored to specific research and policy questions will always be necessary and use-
ful. In this regard, the GTAP approach does not differ from the state of affairs in the wider
academic community, where there appears to be no consensus on one uniform approach to
analyse all the complexities of the CAP.
The last paper by Brockmeier, Efken, Herok and Van Tongeren treats transnational envi-
ronmental issues by discussing the economic effects of an unilateral or harmonised tax on
fertiliser and pesticide use in EU agriculture. Within the last two decades a major shift in
public perception of fertilisers and pesticides used in agriculture has taken place. Whereas the
'green revolution' has put emphasis on higher yields and lower unit costs due to chemical use
in agriculture, public debate in most industrialised countries nowadays focuses on environ-
mental and health risks which might be related to the application of these two inputs.
Consequently, some industrialised countries moved a step further and introduced institutional
restriction on chemical use in agriculture. To this group of countries belong some member
countries of the European Union (EU) as well. Does a national restriction on chemical use in
agriculture make sense within a Customs Union or does this only produce some kind of leak-
age effect between member countries? Brockmeier et al. show how the multi-regional general
equilibrium model GTAP can be adopted to make a first step towards the economic analysis of
restricted chemical use in agriculture. Their focus is on a cost-effectiveness analysis of an en-
vironment-related tax, rather than on an assessment of environmental benefits. The simulation
analysis shows that taxes on fertiliser and pesticides do not affect non-agricultural sectors in
the EU economy or in third countries very much. However, the multi-regional analysis high-
lights the possibility of leakage effects when taxes fertiliser and pesticides are unilaterally
applied within one country of a customs union. Since the standard GTAP database does not
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contain information on fertiliser and pesticide use, nor on taxes levied on these substances, ad-
ditional data collection has been necessary to conduct the analysis. The paper clearly points to
the need for additional data collection to conduct environmentally related analyses.
As many other applied modelling works in this field, the Brockmeier et al. paper does
not attempt to include environmental externalities in the production and utility functions. Con-
sequently, this approach has to be silent on the question of welfare evaluation of
environmental improvements related to the policy change. The focus is on the economic cost-
effectiveness analysis of taxing policies targeted at environmental effects.
An important area of further research in this field is the representation of technologies.
While the current specification of Brockmeier et al. provides for substitution possibilities be-
tween chemical inputs and labour inputs, it is certainly worthwhile to explore the modelling of
substitution between polluting and non-polluting inputs. In addition, and in the context of the
discussions around a 'greening' of agriculture, the possibilities to switch to alternative farming
technologies might be relevant. Naturally, much additional data work and econometric work
would be required.
Conclusions
The GTAP database and its associated modelling efforts represent a major achievement for
advancing quantitative analysis of international trade, resource and environmental issues. The
demonstrative applications contained in this report show that the GTAP framework is easily
adaptable to specific policy questions which centre around the multi-country trade related is-
sues. The applications also highlight the usefulness of a multi-sector general equilibrium
approach for policy analysis, where indirect effects of policy changes in one sector of the
economy trigger resource movements and reallocations within the entire economy. Such indi-
rect effects propagate through markets for land and labour production factors as well as
through markets for final products.
Although the GTAP framework is rather flexible, the applications in this volume clearly
show that specific policy questions require additional efforts. All of the applications have en-
gaged in the collection of additional data, which are either folded into the standard GTAP
dataset to improve the representation of policy instruments, or - in the case of the Brockmeier
et al. paper - are used to supplement the GTAP data for ex-post calculations. It is the area of
database construction where we foresee the greatest benefits from future collaborations
amongst researchers, both within the EU as between EU and non-EU researchers.
The GTAP experience shows that an 'open source' concept to the development and
maintenance of large scale economic models is not only feasible, but also fosters the produc-
tivity of research activities. The 'cost' that is associated with the low entry barriers to this type
of advanced global trade modelling is that individual researchers are free to develop their own
applications according to their own insights and according to the problem at hand.
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2. Economic Impacts of the Enlargement of the European
Union: Analysing the importance of direct payments
Søren E. Frandsen and Hans G. Jensen
2.1 Background 1
The preparations for the enlargement of the European Union (EU) to include several of the
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) has led to a discussion of the future design
of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). First, the debate has clearly shown that it is unten-
able in the longer term to have 'two separate agricultural policies' within the same Community.
Second, it is evident that economic and budgetary implications of the impending enlargement
depend not only on the level of border protection within the EU at the time of accession, but
also on the extent to which the direct payments are extended to the new member countries.
The European Commission has recently clearly indicated that there is a need for dis-
cussing the future role of direct payments. First, the EU's 'financial perspectives' (i.e. the
maximum funding available for EU activities) for the period 2000-06 were drawn up on the
basis of the enlargement taking place without direct payments being made available to the new
member states. Second, in acknowledgement of the expected budgetary strains the EU Com-
missioner for Agriculture Franz Fischler has suggested that direct payments be gradually
phased in the new member states within the context of a transitional post-accession period.
Furthermore, the Commissioner has suggested that the level of the direct payments be progres-
sively reduced over a period of time in order to reduce the pressure on the EU budget, cf. Agra
Europe (2000).
Against this political and budgetary backdrop one of the important questions being
raised is therefore whether or not there is a need to radically change the existing financing
system (who is going to pay for the enlargement?) or the agricultural direct payment system if
such direct payments, as they exist today, are to be introduced in the Central and Eastern
European Countries at the time of accession.
More specifically, the paper analyses the economic implications of extending the sup-
port and protective instruments of the current Common Agricultural Policy, including the
direct payments, to the Central and Eastern Countries. The purpose of this paper is to address
this issue from an economy-wide perspective and to illustrate how a specially tailored GTAP
model and database can address such an important aspect of the economic implications of en-
                                                
1 This paper was prepared for the Policy Workshop of the Concerted Action Fair Project (CT98-4148, financed
by the EU Commission), held in Rotterdam, September 21-22, 2000. The Danish Ministry for Food, Agriculture
and Fisheries has financed the development and adjustments of the economic model and the global database to
enable us to analyse the effects of the enlargement.
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larging the European Union. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the present analysis in
no way pretends to provide a complete analysis of all the important economic aspects related
to the enlargement of the EU.
The paper starts with a brief overview of the important changes that have been made to
the standard GTAP model and database followed by some important characteristics of the sce-
narios presented. The scenarios consist of two distinct parts. First, the construction of a
baseline scenario for the period 1995 to 2010, and second, three enlargement scenarios under
different assumptions with respect to how the Common Agricultural Policy is extended to the
new member countries. The paper concludes by identifying the areas for further research and
by providing some tentative conclusions.
2.2 Adjusting the standard model and database
Adjusting the standard model
The base GTAP model is a standard multi-regional, static computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model. Regional production is produced according to a constant return to scale tech-
nology in a perfectly competitive environment, and the private demand system is represented
by a non-homothetic demand system (a Constant Difference Elasticity function) 1. The foreign
trade structure is characterised by the Armington assumption implying imperfect substitutabil-
ity between domestic and foreign goods, cf. Hertel (1998).
In order to analyse the impacts of extending the Common Agricultural Policy to the
Central and Eastern European Countries it is important to capture the key institutional features
of CAP (the instruments), including the reform achievements of the Uruguay Round and the
more recent reform of the CAP (Agenda 2000). We have therefore explicitly modelled the
following features of the CAP, cf. Bach, Frandsen and Jensen (2000):
- import and export policies, including the import tariff reductions and value and quantity
based restrictions on export subsidies;
- direct payments to arable land and livestock, together with set-aside requirements and
base area restrictions;
- budgetary limits on the total amount allocated to land and livestock according to the in-
stitutional rules of the Common Agricultural Policy;
- milk and sugar quotas;
- the European Union agricultural budget and the important effects of inter-regional trans-
fers between member states.
                                                
1 Hence, the present analysis abstracts from features such as imperfect competition and increasing return to scale,
which may however be important in certain sectors.
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Adjusting the data
The global database used for this analysis is version 4 of the GTAP database, cf. McDougall
(1998). Hence this means that only 5 of the 15 members of the European Union are explicitly
represented in the database (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden United Kingdom and rest
of EU) and seven of the Central and Eastern European Countries are aggregated into just one
region in the database (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia). Version 5 of the database, to be released early 2001, will separate out all 15-
member countries as well as several of the CEECs.
A number of minor adjustments have been made to the standard version 4 database to
allow a more precise representation of the CAP instruments. First, the CAP subsidies have
been allocated to the individual factors of production according to whether the subsidies are
based on output decisions, use of land or capital intensity. Second, the common agricultural
budget has been explicitly represented in the database (the 1995/1996 budget) at the member
state level, including the contribution of the individual member states to the financing of the
agricultural expenditures. Finally, a few of the behavioural parameters have been adjusted.
This includes for example basing the own price elasticity for fish on recent econometric evi-
dence as well as setting the Armington elasticities for livestock to zero. The latter has been
done to avoid unrealistic increases in trade in these products.
2.3 Experimental design
Baseline scenario
Before analysing the enlargement of the EU, a baseline for the period 1995-2010 is con-
structed 1. The baseline provides a benchmark against which alternative scenarios can be
compared. It features projections of the world economy, cf. table 2.1 below, plus incorporation
of policy changes, including a full implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement in all
countries and the effects of changes in the CAP as outlined in the Agenda 2000 reform, cf. box
2.1.
The baseline is shaped by relatively high rates of income growth in the Asian economies
- particularly in China and a number of other developing countries (catching-up) - growth rates
around 4-6% per year. For a number of developed countries, including the current EU member
states, we assume growth rates of approximately 2-2½% per year. The global weighted aver-
age annual growth rate is 3%.
                                                
1 The model is solved using GEMPACK (Harrison and Pearson, 1996).
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Table 2.1 Exogenous assumptions, annual growth rates, 1995-2010
GDP Popula- Total Labour Force Total factor productivity Capital a)
tion labour  
force unskilled skilled industry services primary
resources agriculture
AUS 2.7 1.0 1.0 -1.0 5.2 0.75 0.38 1.05 1.7
NZL 2.5 1.1 1.2 -0.8 5.2 0.75 0.38 1.05 1.2
JPN 1.9 0.1 0.0 -0.7 2.8 0.50 0.25 0.70 1.6
KOR 4.7 0.7 1.3 0.9 4.2 0.75 0.38 1.05 4.7
THA 3.6 0.7 0.9 0.7 4.6 0.75 0.38 1.05 2.7
CHN 7.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 3.4 1.75 0.88 2.45 6.7
TWN 5.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 4.2 1.50 0.75 2.10 4.5
ROA 4.7 1.6 2.2 2.0 4.5 1.00 0.50 1.40 4.0
CAN 2.8 0.8 0.8 -0.7 3.3 1.00 0.50 1.40 2.6
USA 2.6 0.8 0.9 -0.5 3.3 1.00 0.50 1.40 1.7
RLA 4.2 1.4 2.1 1.8 4.1 1.00 0.50 1.40 2.9
GBR 2.2 0.1 0.1 -1.2 2.6 1.00 0.50 1.40 2.0
DEU 2.3 0.1 0.1 -0.8 2.6 1.00 0.50 1.40 1.7
DNK 2.4 0.1 -0.4 -1.9 2.6 1.00 0.50 1.40 3.0
SWE 2.4 0.2 0.0 -1.6 2.6 1.00 0.50 1.40 2.1
FIN 3.0 0.2 -0.4 -1.6 2.6 1.00 0.50 1.40 3.8
REU 2.6 0.1 0.1 -0.8 2.6 1.00 0.50 1.40 1.6
EFT 2.4 0.4 0.4 -1.9 5.2 0.75 0.38 1.05 1.2
CEEC 4.5 -0.1 0.1 -2.1 5.4 1.25 0.63 1.75 6.3
FSU 0.9 0.1 0.5 -1.4 5.4 0.25 0.13 0.35 0.0
MEA 4.0 2.2 3.1 2.9 5.4 0.50 0.25 0.70 3.8
SSA 3.1 2.7 2.9 2.8 4.9 0.50 0.25 0.70 1.2
ROW 2.9 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.8 0.50 0.25 0.70 2.5
a) The endowment of capital is determined endogenously - determined by the exogenous variables shown and by
the model and associated data
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, World Bank forecast, USDA's long term projections and own estimates.
For the Central and Eastern European Countries several important characteristics have
been included in the baseline. First, the CEECs are assumed to partially catch up to the exist-
ing level of income in member states of the European Union as the annual GDP growth rate
for this region is assumed to be 4.5% compared to around 2.5% for the European Union. Sec-
ond, the baseline is shaped by higher rates of annual productivity growth in these reforming
economies, e.g. it is assumed that total factor productivity in CEECs agriculture increases by
1.75% per year compared to 1.4% in the industrialised countries.
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Box 2.1 Assumptions shaping the baseline 1995-2010
Projections
Shocks to GDP, factor endowments and population
Sector specific shocks to total factor productivity
Capital stocks endogenously determined
Uruguay Round Agreement
Tariff reductions according to Agreement
Export subsidy rates are adjusted in line with changes in tariff rates
If export subsidy commitment (either in value or quantity) is binding, the export subsidy rate is further reduced
Agenda 2000 Reform
Intervention prices reduced (export subsidy reductions)
Hectare and livestock premiums and milk quota adjusted according to reform
National Envelopes and new premiums introduced
All direct payments are deflated by 2% per year (the (maximum) budgetary outlays are fixed in nominal terms)
Set aside reflects the 10% requirement
Sugar quota unchanged
Blair House Agreement concerning oilseeds abolished
Central and Eastern European Countries
Protection levels adjusted according to the recent PSE indicators (protection is raised from its 1995 to 1998 lev-
els).
Third, the recent changes in the agricultural policies of the CEECs have been incorpo-
rated in the baseline reflecting steps in the direction of significant increases in protection for a
number of agricultural products. Given these exogenous assumptions, the data and the as-
sumed behavioural parameters in the GTAP database, the model endogenously determines the
implied annual growth rate in the stock of capital (the last column in the table). For the CEECs
the implied annual growth rate of the capital stock is 6.3% whereas the corresponding growth
rates in the EU member countries are between 2 and 4%. This growth rate implies that the
capital-output ratio in the CEECs rises. The border protection and domestic support levels in
the CEECs are shown in table 2.2 for the beginning (1995) and the end of the baseline period
(2010). Import protection for wheat, other grains, oilseeds, and sugar and dairy products is as-
sumed, as reported by the OECD (2000), to increase significantly in the CEECs during the
period considered whereas the protection of other meat products (mainly pork and poultry
meat) is assumed to decrease somewhat. In 2010 only sugar, other meat products and dairy
products receive noteworthy export subsidies. The corresponding data for the EU-15 countries
are shown in the appendix to this chapter. The table also reflects the assumption that the ob-
served increases in protection in the Central and Eastern European Countries are incorporated
mainly in the form of increased import protection. In the case of export subsidies we have
abolished the taxation of exports in a few cases, and the use of export subsidies is not in-
creased in the baseline considering the CEECs' Uruguay Round Commitments and the
budgetary limitations facing a number of these countries.
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Enlargement scenarios
The enlargement scenario considered in this paper entails the integration of the Central and
Eastern European Countries into the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy in the
year 2010 in a world shaped by the baseline scenario 1.
Enlargement of the European Union implies in principle that all tariffs and export subsi-
dies as well as non-tariff barriers between the EU and the CEECs are abolished. At the same
time all sectors in the CEECs are given the same level of protection against third countries as
found in the EU at the time of accession. This leads to substantial increases in the CEECs ag-
ricultural protection rates against third country suppliers of cereals, sugar, bovine meat and
dairy products. In the case of vegetables, fruit and nuts, oilseeds, other crops, beverage and to-
bacco and other processed food products, the pre-enlargement border protection rates in the
CEECs are above the EU-15 levels. Therefore, integrating the CEECs into the CAP leads to
reductions in border protection rates for these commodities, cf. table 2.2.
The enlargement scenario also extends the reformed (Agenda 2000) CAP to the new
member countries including the common financing of the agricultural policy (import tariffs
and GDP contributions) and transfers from the EU-15 to pay for export subsidies, output sub-
sidies and hectare and livestock premiums in the new member countries.
                                                
1 The macroeconomic closure used is a neo-classical closure where investments are endogenous and adjust to ac-
commodate any changes in savings. This approach is adopted at the global level and investments are then
allocated across regions to equalise the marginal rate of return in all regions. Although global investments and
savings must be equal, this does not apply at the regional level, where the trade balance is endogenously deter-
mined as the difference between regional savings and regional investments. This is valid as regional savings enter
the regional utility function. The numéraire used in the model is a price index as suggested by de Melo and
Robinson (1989) and de Melo and Tarr (1992), namely the global primary factor price index.
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Table 2.2 Protection and output subsidies, CEEC, % (levels) and % points (change)
Import tariff equivalent Export subsidies Output subsidies
  
1995 2010 enlarg. 1995 2010 enlarg. 1995 2010 enlarg.
levels levels change levels levels change levels levels change
Wheat -17.9 12.3 0.0 -17.9 0.0 0.0 5.1 6.0 0.3
Other grains -15.3 -0.6 45.1 -15.3 -0.6 23.2 4.9 5.8 -0.7
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 11.1 11.0 -5.8 0.0 0.0 -0.9 0.4 0.4 0.5
Oilseeds 3.8 7.0 -7.0 3.8 3.8 -3.8 6.0 6.6 2.3
Sugar cane and beet 29.1 61.0 15.5 29.1 29.1 47.7 4.0 4.6 -7.2
Other crops 8.9 9.9 -3.4 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.4 0.4 -0.1
Bovine animals 2.3 -4.0 79.7 2.3 -4.0 72.8 6.1 7.0 -0.7
Other animal products 8.8 9.1 -8.6 33.8 9.1 9.5 5.2 6.0 3.0
Raw milk - - - - - - 5.9 5.9 3.0
Wool 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.9 25.1
Fish 7.3 4.6 1.2 0.0 0.0 -0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.6
Resource extraction 1.3 1.2 -1.2 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -2.6 -2.6 3.1
Bovine meat products 2.3 -4.0 79.5 2.3 -4.0 72.9 7.6 8.5 -7.9
Other meat products 33.8 9.1 9.5 33.8 9.1 9.6 7.5 8.4 -7.8
Vegetable oils and fats 3.8 3.8 -3.8 3.8 3.8 -3.8 1.9 1.9 -1.5
Dairy products 20.5 50.3 65.6 20.5 20.5 63.3 0.2 1.8 -0.8
Sugar 29.1 61.0 15.5 29.1 29.1 47.6 1.9 2.5 -1.7
Other processed foods 14.2 14.5 -4.9 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.5 1.5 -0.6
Beverages and tobacco 36.6 35.0 -11.7 0.0 0.0 -0.6 0.7 0.7 -24.7
Manufactures 8.0 7.0 -3.4 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -1.9
Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.3 -0.3 -2.1
Note: Columns (levels) indicate the level of the tax or subsidy in CEECs before accession and columns (change)
are the change in taxes or subsidies in percent points associated with an enlargement
Source: GTAP version 4 database, OECD PSE tables and own calculations.
The expansion of the CAP to the CEECs also implies that sugar and milk quotas are es-
tablished on the basis of production levels in the CEECs prior to the enlargement in 2010 and
that base area and animal premium rights are limited to historic production levels in
1994/1995.
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Box 2.2 The Design of the Enlargement Scenarios
Common for all three scenarios is that:
- the new member states are given the same level of border protection (import tariff and export subsidy
rates) and output subsidy rates as in the EU at the time of accession (2010);
- production of milk and sugar in the CEECs are limited by quotas - established on the basis of production
levels prior to enlargement (2010);
- all member countries contribute to the common financing of the EU agricultural budget;
- the common contribution rate across the member states is determined endogenously by the model given
the estimated costs of the CAP (the rate balances the EU agricultural budget).
To illustrate the effects on the direct payments, three scenarios have been analysed. They all differ according to
the extent to which direct payments are extended to the CEECs:
Scenario 1: No direct payments are given to the CEEC.
It is assumed that the new member states will not receive the Agenda 2000 direct payments – while the farmers in
the 'old' member countries continue to receive such payments. This scenario corresponds to the content of the
'EU's Financial perspectives'.
Scenario 2: Same level of existing direct payments
It is assumed that farmers in 'both regions' will be treated equally - also in terms of eligibility for hectare and live-
stock premiums.
The maximum amount allocated to the new member states is determined as the EU per hectare or per head pre-
miums and a defined base area or herd eligible for such payments in the CEECs. The base areas has been fixed to
almost 27 million hectares assuming an average yield of 4.77 ton (EU average). The set-aside rate in the CEECs
is equalised with the EU-15 rate. The following (maximum) number of premiums in the new member countries
have been fixed to 1,205,900, 12,090,300 and 3,740,550 for suckler cows, mother ewes and male bovine animals,
respectively.
If the area or number of animals exceed the total base area or maximum number of animals the direct payments
are reduced proportionally in line with the overshoot of the total area or number of animals.
Scenario 3: 2/3 of the existing level of direct payment in all member states
Scenario 3 is based on the same assumptions as scenario 2 except that the (per unit) level of direct payments in
the old EU-15 member states is reduced by 33%. The CEECs will receive a similar payment level (as in the old
EU countries) when they are fully integrated in 2010. This scenario corresponds to the so-called principle of de-
gressivity - i.e. that the direct payments in the old member countries would be progressively reduced over a
period of time while the direct payments to the new member states would be progressively increased to the same
level.
It is also important to stress, that the scenarios are based on the assumption - in line with
the present rules under the Common Agricultural Policy - that the premium per hectare is re-
duced proportionally to the extent the total reform crop area exceeds the total defined base
area. The total budgetary outlay is fixed (pre-defined as the EU per hectare premium multi-
plied by the defined base area eligible for the payments), however, the assumption used
implies that there are no effective restrictions (in economic terms) at the individual farm level
limiting the incentive to increase the reform crop area. This implies that there are no limita-
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tions restricting the reallocation of land in the enlargement scenarios analysed affecting in
particular the estimated crops supply response in the new member countries (area reallocated
from non-eligible crops to eligible crops).
Further, as indicated above, the extent to which farmers in the new member states will
receive the same land and livestock premiums as the farmers in the 'old' member states is an
unresolved issues. Hence, the precise conditions for the enlargement of the Union are yet un-
known, and the three enlargement scenarios analysed here are therefore used to illustrate the
impact of different possible levels of the direct payments to the new member states, cf. box
2.2. Figure 2.1 summarises the experimental design.
Figure 2.1 Experimental design
2.4 Results
Before examining the results of the enlargement scenarios it is useful to have an impression of
the base line projection against which these experiments are performed.
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Supply response
In the baseline both an expansionary and a substitution effect determine the changes in output.
The expansionary effect represents the effects of growth in domestic and foreign demand
shaped by income and population growth and the assumed income elasticities. The substitu-
tion effect reflects the changes in relative competitiveness shaped by changes in relative
productivity, costs of production as well as the effects of any policy changes. The estimated
annual changes in production in the EU and CEECs in the period 1995-2010 are shown in fig-
ure 2.2 for selected commodities 1.
Agricultural production in the European Union increases only marginally in the period
considered - typically less than 1% per year. The production of wheat and other grains falls
marginally due to lower export subsidy rates (complying with the Agenda 2000 reform and the
Uruguay Round Agreement). The production of 'other meat products' (pork and poultry meat)
increases by 1.3% per year - mainly a result of increased global food demand (in for example
Asia and China) and increased competitiveness relative to the production of milk and bovine
meat products.
The agricultural production in the CEECs increases somewhat more - typically 1 to 3%
per year. This reflects the tendency to increased agricultural protection for some of the com-
modities and the assumed high rates of agricultural productivity growth. For example, the
production of dairy products and sugar increase by more than 3% per year - a result of more
than a doubling of the import tariff rates from 1995 to 1998 as reported by the OECD. The
production of wheat and other grains is estimated to increase between 1.3 and 3.7% per year -
also a result of a tendency to higher agricultural protection. For the non-agricultural com-
modities the production results reflect the high overall growth assumptions applied to the
reforming countries - the production of manufactured goods and services increase by 4.2 and
3.0% per year, respectively.
Extending the Common Agricultural Policy to the new member states is expected to af-
fect the agricultural supply response significantly given the applied assumptions. As indicated
above in box 2.2, the three enlargement scenarios differs with respect to the extent the direct
payments are extended to the CEECs - while at the same time all three scenarios are charac-
terised by the same and typically higher level of the border protection (being equalised with
the EU level of protection). In all three enlargement scenarios this implies that agricultural
border protection increases significantly for a number of commodities, e.g. 'other grains',
'sugar', 'bovine meat products', and 'dairy products', cf. table 2.2. The estimated impact on pro-
duction levels in the EU and CEECs is shown in table 2.3 for each of the three scenarios 2. The
results illustrate that the supply response in both the old and new member countries depend
critically on the level of the direct payments given to the new member states.
                                                
1 Given the applied macroeconomic assumptions the real exchange rate in the CEEC appreciates by 6.8% in the
baseline.
2 Note that the results shown from the baseline are yearly changes whereas the reported results in the enlarge-
ment scenarios are accumulated or total changes in the levels in 2010.
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Figure 2.2 Annual changes in production, selected commodities, percent, 1995-2010
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Table 2.3 Enlargement: Change in production, selected commodities, percentage
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
  
EU15 CEEC EU15 CEEC EU15 CEEC
Wheat -0.4 -6.6 -1.9 12.3 -2.2 7.0
Other grains -3.7 28.9 -7.2 63.2 -7.6 55.3
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 0.9 -4.4 2.8 -13.9 3.6 -11.7
Oilseeds 0.4 -12.5 -0.3 -0.4 -1.6 -4.3
Sugar cane and beet 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other crops 1.0 -13.4 1.4 -30.9 3.6 -29.9
Bovine animals -4.3 93.9 -3.9 85.1 -7.4 91.1
Other animal products -0.4 -0.9 -0.1 -4.3 0.1 -3.4
Raw milk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bovine meat products -6.9 142.7 -6.3 129.2 -9.4 138.9
Other meat products 0.0 -0.6 0.4 -5.6 0.4 -4.3
Vegetable oils and fats 0.0 -7.9 0.0 -3.4 -0.1 -4.8
Dairy products 0.2 32.2 0.1 30.4 0.3 30.8
Sugar -0.3 5.0 -0.3 4.8 -0.3 4.8
Other processed foods 0.1 0.1 0.2 -1.4 0.2 -1.0
Beverages and tobacco 5.0 -59.2 5.2 -60.3 5.2 -60.0
Manufactures -0.1 3.8 0.0 2.2 0.0 2.7
Services 0.0 -1.8 -0.1 -0.9 0.0 -1.1
In scenario 1, where no direct payments are provided to the farmers in the new member
states, the production of wheat falls by almost 7% in the CEECs while the production of 'other
grains' increases by almost 30%. This difference is due to the fact, that accession to the CAP
will not change CEECs border protection for wheat whereas the CEECs import tariff rate for
'other grains' will increase significantly, i.e. by 45 percentage points. Of course, these results
depend on the relative level of protection in the two regions prior to enlargement and thereby
the assumed changes in protection in the period prior to enlargement (the baseline assump-
tions).
The production of bovine meat products in the CEECs more than doubles due to signifi-
cantly higher protection rates for these products equivalent to an increase of 80-percentage
points in the import tariff rate. The production of dairy products increases by a third in spite of
the enforcement of milk quota at the farm level. This is explained by a significant shift in the
consumption pattern in the CEECs - the on-farm consumption of milk is reduced significantly
and the deliveries to dairies increase correspondingly.
In scenario 2 where premiums are set at the Agenda 2000 level and extended to the
farmers in the new member countries, production of both crops increases significantly due to
the now much higher return to land. Production of wheat and other grains in the CEECs in-
creases by 12 and 63%, respectively. For the remaining commodities, the supply response
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corresponds approximately to the supply response in scenario 1 - except for 'vegetables, fruit
and nuts' and 'other crops' as the relative competitiveness of these crops falls significantly -
they do not qualify for direct payments or at least only very limited support.
In scenario 3 the structural shift in production in the CEECs is slightly more moderate
due to the lower level of direct payments extended to the new member states. By comparing
the three scenarios, it is evident that the other land using sectors (which do not receive CAP
payments) are also affected by the extent to which the direct payments are extended to the new
member regions. Furthermore, the enlargement only marginally affects agricultural production
in the EU-15 region. There are a few exceptions. Production of 'other grains', 'bovine animals'
and 'bovine meat products' fall by 4-9% in the scenarios considered. The milk and sugar quo-
tas in the EU-15 are binding in all scenarios and therefore the enlargement does not affect the
production of these products, although the value of the quotas is marginally reduced due to
slightly lower market prices in the EU.
Supply response in the individual EU-member countries
Enlarging the European Union affects the individual member countries differently depending
on a number of factors such as the structure and level of production and trade. In table A1.2 of
the Appendix, the impact on the level of production in the individual member countries is
shown. The importance to the individual economies of the estimated percentage changes is
difficult to compare across the individual member countries. In Denmark, for example, the
production of bovine meat products is relatively small - Denmark specialises in milk produc-
tion as opposed to raising cattle for meat production. More importantly in this case is the
estimated increase in the production of other meat products (1.5 and 3.5% in scenario 2 and 3,
respectively) given that Denmark is a relative large producer of pork. The results (not shown)
also indicate that the individual country shares of overall EU agricultural production (the intra-
industry competitiveness) changes somewhat due to the enlargement and that these changes
depend on the level of direct payments given to the new member countries. In the case of other
meat products, for example, Danish pig producers typically gain market shares in most of the
'old' member states as well as in the new member countries under the applied assumptions.
Allocation of land and yields
The size of the direct payments will - as expected - significantly affect the use of the agricul-
tural land in the new member countries, cf. table 2.4. Between 1995 and 2010 the total area
allocated to the reform crops is estimated to increase from 27 to 30 million hectares (according
to the base line). In terms of structural change, land is being reallocated from 'vegetables, fruit
and nuts' production and grassland and towards wheat production (protection of wheat has in-
creased significantly since 1995 (OECD, 2000).
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Table 2.4 Grown area and average yield per hectare in the CEECs region
1995 2010 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Millions of hectares
Wheat 8.53 11.47 10.33 12.86 12.14
Other grains 15.40 15.24 18.09 24.55 22.92
Oilseeds 2.34 2.22 1.88 2.23 2.12
Other crops 0.67 0.72 0.60 0.47 0.48
Set-aside 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.46 4.18
Total 26.93 29.65 30.90 44.56 41.83
Tons per hectare
Wheat 3.36 4.34 4.50 4.34 4.38
Other grains 2.91 3.58 3.88 3.62 3.69
Oilseeds 1.65 2.02 2.08 2.00 2.03
Note: In 1998 the arable land in the CEECs was 52.2 million hectares
Source: Agricultural Situation and Prospects in the Central and Eastern European Countries and own calcula-
tions.
Enlarging the Union intensifies this effect when direct payments are extended to the
farmers in the CEECs. The total area used for production of these reform crops increases by
more than a third in scenario 2 and 3, which corresponds to 14 and 11 million hectares of land,
respectively 1. The lower part of table 2.4 shows the endogenously determined yields per hec-
tare in the CEECs. The yields are estimated to increase significantly in the baseline -
narrowing the spread to the EU-15 average from around 40% to around 20% (convergence),
cf. table 2.4 and 2.5. Yields per hectare in the EU fall slightly in the baseline due to the
Agenda 2000 reform and the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement, i.e. lower
border protection and output prices but higher direct payments. The extent the direct payments
are extended to the CEECs does only marginally affect the yields per hectare in the EU-15 re-
gion, cf. table 2.5, due to changing market prices.
                                                
1 Note that the total budget for hectare premiums in the new member countries is fixed. This implies that an in-
crease in the area beyond the defined base area leads to a proportionate reduction in the premium per hectare. As
mentioned above the scenarios are based on the assumption that there are no - in economic terms - effective re-
strictions on the reallocation of land at the individual farm level and thereby at the national level.
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Table 2.5 Grown area and average yield per hectare in the EU-15 region
1995 2010 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Millions of hectares
Wheat 16.45 17.25 17.26 17.20 16.74
Other grains 20.67 21.99 21.90 21.77 20.02
Oilseeds 4.70 3.76 3.77 3.75 3.67
Other crops 1.29 1.58 1.59 1.60 1.69
Set-aside 7.26 5.85 5.85 5.82 5.53
Total 50.37 50.42 50.38 50.13 47.66
Tons per hectare
Wheat 5.30 4.97 4.95 4.90 5.01
Other grains 4.73 4.20 4.06 3.94 4.26
Oilseeds 2.18 2.78 2.78 2.77 2.80
Source: The Agricultural situation in The European Union, 1998 Report and own calculations.
It is also evident from table 2.4 that the supply response for grains in the CEECs re-
ported earlier is - as expected - mainly a result of changes in the structural reallocation of land,
as yield per hectare remain almost constant across the three scenarios.
Land prices
The impact on the price of agricultural land in the three enlargement scenarios is shown in ta-
ble 2.6. As expected, land prices increase tremendously in the new member countries given
the significantly higher level of border protection for many products and the introduction of
direct payments. In scenario 1 land prices increases by almost 40% in the CEECs and supple-
menting this increased border protection by the introduction of hectare and livestock
premiums leads to increases of 170 and 130% in scenario 2 and 3, respectively.
For the 'old' member countries, the enlargement even without extending the direct pay-
ments schemes to the CEECs region will affect the land prices negatively, although only
marginally, cf. table 2.6. It is, however, evident that lowering the direct payments by a third
will reduce land prices significantly in the EU-15 region. The simulations indicate that given
such a scenario, land prices would fall by 20-30% in the EU member countries. The degree to
which land prices are affected in the individual member countries reflects differences in the
structure of production and hence the extent to which the individual agricultural markets are
affected by the enlargement.
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Table 2.6 Changes in land prices, percent
Denmark Finland Germany Sweden United Kingdom Rest of EU CEEC
Scenario 1 -1.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 38.7
Scenario 2 -1.9 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -0.5 0.2 170.4
Scenario 3 -22.8 -23.0 -24.7 -29.1 -22.5 -22.3 129.8
International trade
Enlarging the European Union and extending the Common Agricultural Policy to the new
member countries will increase competition in the European agricultural markets and thereby
affect the trade between the EU-15 and the CEECs. The expected implications for trade be-
tween the two regions are illustrated in table 2.7 and 2.8. To illustrate the importance of the
increased trade between the two regions, the results are presented in terms of shares of domes-
tic consumption in the EU and the CEECs satisfied by CEECs and EU imports, respectively.
The first two columns of table 2.7 illustrate the pre-enlargement EU imports from the
CEECs - measured as a share of total EU usage (for intermediate inputs and final consump-
tion) of the individual commodities. For all the commodities shown, EU imports of good and
services from the CEECs region in both years shown satisfies only a minor share of overall
EU consumption. In the case of oilseeds CEECs - having the largest share of EU domestic
consumption - import from that region only amount to slightly more than 2% of total EU con-
sumption in both years. Nevertheless, the CEECs share of grains and manufactured goods are
estimated to double from 1995 to 2010. This is due to significantly higher protection rates in
the CEECs region in the case of grains and relatively high rates of production growth in the
case of the labour intensive manufactured goods in the Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries. The last three columns in table 2.7 report how these 2010 import shares are affected by
each of the three enlargement scenarios. In all three scenarios the CEECs increase their share
of total EU consumption of especially grains, bovine meat products, dairy products and sugar.
Relative to the pre-enlargement situation, the CEECs share of total EU consumption for these
commodities increases significantly - an estimated increase of 5 to 15 times the estimated
shares in 2010. In the case of other grains the CEECs share of total EU use increases from less
than 1% of total use prior to the enlargement to 5 and almost 9% in scenario 1 and 2, respec-
tively.
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Table 2.7 CEECs' share of total EU-15 consumption, percentage
1995 2010 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Wheat 0.7 1.4 2.4 3.4 3.1
Other grains 0.4 0.8 5.0 8.7 8,0
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.3
Oilseeds 2.4 2.2 1.7 2.4 2.1
Sugar cane and beet 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other crops 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
Bovine animals 2.0 2.1 1.4 1.4 1.3
Other animal products 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Raw milk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bovine meat products 0.3 0.5 8.7 8.0 8.7
Other meat products 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2
Vegetable oils and fats 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Dairy products 0.2 0.3 2.0 1.9 1.9
Sugar 0.4 0.6 1.7 1.7 1.7
Other processed foods 0.3 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.9
Beverages and tobacco 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4
Manufactures 1.1 1.9 2.7 2.6 2.6
Services 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
In conclusion, extending the direct payment as well as the level of such payments pro-
vided to the farmers in the new member states is estimated to affect the EU-CEEC trade
significantly. It is, however, also noteworthy that extending the EU border protection alone
(scenario 1) to the new member countries also accounts for a relatively large share of the in-
creased CEECs share of total EU consumption.
Analysing the opposite trade flow - exports from the EU-15 to the CEECs - also illus-
trate that enlarging the European Union and extending the instruments of the Common
Agricultural Policy to the new member countries will lead to increased trade between the two
regions. In some cases the enlargement leads to significantly larger trade shares between the
two regions. The EU-15 shares of total CEECs use are estimated to increase for a number of
commodities, especially for manufactured goods, beverages and tobacco, 'other crops' and
'vegetables, fruit and nuts', cf. table 2.8.
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Table 2.8 EU-15 share of total consumption in the CEEC, percentage
1995 2010 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Wheat 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Other grains 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 3.8 4.4 7.1 11.3 10.4
Oilseeds 4.4 4.5 5.7 4.7 4.9
Sugar cane and beet 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Other crops 15.0 23.4 38.2 41.4 42.1
Bovine animals 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3
Other animal products 2.8 3.0 3.2 2.9 2.9
Raw milk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bovine meat products 2.0 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.2
Other meat products 4.2 7.5 7.7 9.5 9.0
Vegetable oils and fats 10.8 7.9 9.5 8.6 8.9
Dairy products 4.1 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.2
Sugar 11.7 3.8 6.1 6.0 6.0
Other processed foods 7.5 4.6 7.2 7.6 7.5
Beverages and tobacco 4.7 3.2 51.8 53.3 52.8
Manufactures 24.0 15.9 22.1 22.4 22.3
Services 3.2 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.6
The EU budget and inter-regional transfers
As indicated in the introduction one of the important questions being raised is whether or not
there is a need to radically change the existing financing system (who is going to pay for the
enlargement?) or the agricultural direct payment system if such direct payments are to be in-
troduced in the Central and Eastern European Countries.
Table 2.9 illustrates the budgetary effects in the baseline and in the three enlargement
scenarios analysed. The budget for 1995 is for the EAGGF financial year 1995/1996 and
shows that the net cost of the CAP in that year was EUR 42 billion. Given the assumptions
applied in the model analysis this net cost increases to EUR 48 billion in 2010 (current prices)
- a nominal increase of 14% in total. This increase falls within the guidelines provided in the
EU 'Financial perspectives' for the period 2000-2006 1.
To balance the EU agricultural budget the common rate of member state GDP contribu-
tions is reduced from 0.67% of GDP in 1995 to 0.47% in 2010. Note that this contribution rate
                                                
1 In the Agriculture Newsletter of the European Commission, March 1999, the total expenditure of the future
CAP in 2006 is reported to be EUR 41.7 billion (1999 prices). Using a deflator of 2% per year this corresponds to
approximately 48 billion in that year. Extending the period using the similar assumptions, the total expenditure of
the future CAP amounts to EUR 56 billion in the year 2010 (current prices).
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is determined endogenously by the model given the estimated costs of the CAP. The reported
fall in the contribution rate by definition reflects the 14% increase in net costs and an ap-
proximately 44% increase in the real GDP in the EU in the period considered. The net cost of
the extending the CAP to the new members is by definition highly dependent on the extent to
which the direct payments are included in the agreement. Without extending these payments,
the net cost increases by EUR 5.5 billion or by 11% (scenario 1). This increase is explained
entirely by increased output subsidies and export refunds. In scenario 2, the net cost increases
by more than EUR 16 billion - a result directly related to the hectare and livestock premiums
of a similar order of magnitude. The increase corresponds to a 34% increase in the net costs of
the Common Agricultural Policy.
In scenario 3, in which the direct payments in the 'old' member countries are reduced by
a third and the new member countries receive similar direct payments, the net cost of the CAP
is estimated to add up to approximately EUR 52 billion. This corresponds to an increase of 8%
relative to the estimated 2010 budgetary costs of EUR 48 billion. The significantly lower cost
relative to scenario 2 is of course the assumed lower direct payment to the farmers in both the
old and new member countries.
Table 2.9 Financial impact of extending the CAP to the CEECs (million EUR at current prices)
1995 2010 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Total agricultural expenditure 43,152 49,372 54,726 65,505 53,166
of which
Hectare premiums 15,992 15,994 15,983 24,448 16,299
Livestock premiums 4,150 10,266 10,266 12,487 8,324
Output subsidies 17,306 18,503 22,317 22,425 22,400
Export refunds 5,705 4,610 6,160 6,145 6,143
Levies -940 -1,125 -1,032 -1,039 -1,058
Net cost of CAP: 42,213 48,248 53,694 64,466 52,108
- as % of GDP 0.67 0.47 0.50 0.61 0.49
Note: The 1995 figures are taken from the EAGGF financial year 1995/1996 and figures for 2010 are all deflated
by an inflation rate of 2% per year as the (maximum) budgetary outlays are fixed in nominal terms.
The design of the scenarios seem to support the view that by reducing the Agenda 2000
premiums by a third the enlargement (with 'one common' agricultural policy) can be kept
within the existing budgetary costs of the Common Agricultural Policy. That is, the common
contribution rate is estimated to 0.49% of GDP (approximately similar to the estimated rate in
2010) or a total cost below the extrapolated costs of the future CAP of EUR 56 billion using a
deflator of 2% per year.
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Leaving the aggregate EU budget, table 2.10 illustrates the impact on net contributions
of the individual member countries to the Common Agricultural Budget in the three scenarios.
Net contributions are defined as the contribution (a percent of their GDP) less support received
(output subsidies, hectare and livestock premiums) and import tariff revenue collected.
In 1995 and 2010 Germany, United Kingdom and Sweden were net contributors to the
CAP budget whereas the 'Rest of EU', Denmark and Finland were net receivers of financial
support from the CAP budget 1. Enlarging the European Union leads to higher net contribu-
tions for all the old member states whereas the new member countries - not surprisingly are
net receivers of transfers from the CAP budget. Germany, for example, is in scenario 3 re-
quired to transfer additional EUR 2.1 billion to the Common Agricultural Budget compared
with a no-enlargement situation, corresponding to a total net transfer of EUR 9.1 billion in
2010. In the case of Denmark - being a net receiver of EU transfers - the net transfer will be
reduced by 50 and 60% if the enlargement takes place as assumed in scenario 2 and 3, respec-
tively.
Table 2.10 Net contributions to the CAP budget (million EUR at current prices)
Change in net payments 2010

1995 2010 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Denmark -446 -564 68 293 347
Finland -101 -210 50 208 164
Germany 5,530 6,991 918 4,006 2,103
Sweden 516 425 94 372 263
United Kingdom 2,224 1,963 427 1,743 1,360
Rest of EU -7,722 -8,605 1,944 7,251 6,572
CEEC 0 0 -3,500 -13,873 -10,808
Total 0 0 0 0 0
Welfare implications
More important than such budgetary implications are the overall welfare implications - al-
though the political debate very often focuses exclusively on the effects on the 'visible budget'.
The welfare effects include changes in allocative efficiency, terms of trade, inter-regional
transfers and contributions from other factors (changes in endowments, technical change and
                                                
1 Note that the 'Rest of EU' hides significant differences across the countries included in this aggregate.
38
the effect of non-homothetic preferences). The welfare effects quantified by using the money
metric value of the Equivalent Variation are shown in table 2.11.
Table 2.11 Change in economic welfare, 1995, million EUR
Denmark Finland Germany Sweden UK Rest of EU EU15 CEEC
Scenario 1
Total welfare change -126 -34 -1,034 -56 -57 -832 -2,139 3,331
-of which
Efficiency -17 8 460 50 80 1,076 1,657 -489
Terms of trade effects -71 -6 -654 -47 164 -513 -1,128 1,434
Transfers -50 -37 -683 -69 -317 -1,444 -2,601 2,563
Other effects 12 2 -157 10 16 50 -68 -177
Scenario 2
Total welfare change -323 -159 -3,590 -300 -1,070 -4,907 -10,350 9,499
-of which
Efficiency -49 0 484 19 80 1,033 1,567 -1,531
Terms of trade effects -85 -20 -793 -67 114 -714 -1,564 1,860
Transfers -218 -155 -2,979 -277 -1,295 -5,389 -10,313 10,078
Other effects 28 16 -303 24 31 163 -40 -907
Scenario 3
Total welfare change -361 -112 -1,794 -181 -593 -3,712 -6,753 7,782
-of which
Efficiency -31 15 627 50 244 1,918 2,823 -1,127
Terms of trade effects -92 -11 -745 -50 149 -888 -1,637 1,817
Transfers -258 -122 -1,563 -196 -1,011 -4,883 -8,031 7,867
Other effects 19 5 -114 15 25 141 92 -775
Note: Economic welfare is measured as the money value of the Equivalent Variation (1995-level). 'Other effects'
include welfare changes due to changes in endowments, technical change, and effects of non-homothetic prefer-
ences.
In total, the CEECs are estimated to gain a welfare improvement of approximately EUR
3, 10 and 8 billion in each of the three scenarios. These increases correspond to a welfare gain
of 1.2, 3.4 and 2.8%, respectively. Note, however, that the (relatively small) welfare effects
reported in this paper is explained entirely by the impacts of extending the Common Agricul-
tural Policy to the Central and Eastern European Countries as the objective of this study has
been to study these aspects. Therefore, the welfare effects reported do not include the effects
of an extension of the structural funds support or the possible important effects of dynamic ef-
ficiency gains from trade liberalisation's or the potential role foreign direct investments might
have (i.e. enhanced capital accumulation and higher productivity growth).
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The overall welfare loss for the EU-15 is estimated to be very small. The loss corre-
sponds to approximately 0.03, 0.15 and 0.10% of total welfare in the three scenarios. This
covers the economic impacts of both trade creation and trade diversion effects as well as the
costs associated with transfers of income from EU-15 citizen to CEECs farmers through the
CAP budget scheme. Decomposing the welfare losses experienced in the EU and the welfare
gains experienced in the CEECs reveals that the story to be told is primarily one of redistribu-
tion from Western European tax payers to Eastern European farmers.
The efficiency gains achieved in the EU countries are relatively large when the direct
payments are reduced by a third (scenario 3) whereas the contribution to the welfare change
from the transfers is relatively large when the full CAP is extended to the new member coun-
tries (scenario 2). As expected, the contribution of terms of trade changes on welfare is almost
unaffected by the extent to which the direct payments are provided to the farmers in the new
member countries.
We find a similar pattern of welfare decomposition at the individual country level, al-
though there are a few interesting differences. Differences in supply responses and changes in
exports and imports as well as differences in tax structures in general explain these variations.
In scenario 3, for example, the Danish welfare loss - being the largest relative loss - corre-
sponds to a loss of 0.25% of national income whereas the remaining countries lose
approximately 0.1% of their national income.
This somewhat higher loss of income is partly explained by an increase in the Danish
export of dairy products to third countries. The larger export of dairy products from the
CEECs region to the 'old' member countries does not (as seen for other agricultural commodi-
ties) lead to a lower level of production in the 'old' member countries (the quota value is
clearly still positive). The increased surplus of dairy products is exported to third countries
supported by export subsidies with a loss of efficiency as a consequence. This loss is relative
large in the Danish case, Denmark being both a relative large producer of milk and a relative
large net-exporter of these products.
2.5 Areas for future research
The results estimated in this analysis are no better than the data and parameters used and our
efforts has identified areas that require further data work in the future. These include for ex-
ample improvements of the base data to more adequately reflect actual allocation of land
across the crops producing sectors in especially the Central and Eastern European Countries as
well as improvements in the cost structures - especially the factor cost shares in the land using
sectors. A few of the input-output tables also need to be adjusted with respect to the links be-
tween the primary agricultural sectors and the processing industries.
Representing the CAP correctly also requires an adequately representation of the EU
sugar regime, including the sugar levies and A, B and C sugar quotas (and rents) in the data-
base and the model. Also, the estimates of the milk quota rents in each of the 15 EU member
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states need to be updated. Furthermore, an explicit representation of the tariff rate quotas
(TRQs) in the database and the model would clearly enhance the usefulness of the database
and the model for future policy studies as well as there is a need for econometric studies fo-
cusing on the determination of important behavioural parameters.
2.6 Conclusions and the need for further efforts
The analysis in this paper is a modest attempt to demonstrate that the GTAP general frame-
work can be adjusted to address important policy relevant questions such as the economic
impacts of an EU enlargement in general and the importance of the direct payments in par-
ticular. Naturally, the results estimated are no better than the data and parameters used and our
work has identified areas for future data and model extensions.
There is no doubt that the standard GTAP model and database - like any other standard
model - has to be adjusted and changed to be able to address more detailed policy issues such
as the one addressed in this paper. The methods used correspond to some of our earlier work;
cf. Bach (et al. 2000) and Frandsen (et al. 2000) supplemented by more detailed modelling at
the individual country level. Particular effort has been put into the modelling of the financial
issues related to the EU budget and the impact on the net transfers between the current and
future member countries.
The analysis demonstrates, that the CEECs have a solid potential for increasing their
production of agricultural commodities but also of labour-intensive manufactured goods. If the
CEECs are integrated into the present CAP of the EU (with the Agenda 2000 reform fully im-
plemented) it will significantly boost agricultural production in some sectors and lead to a
reallocation of resources between the different crops.
The analysis shows that the level of direct payments will affect the supply response in
the CEECs. It illustrates that the major force behind the significant supply response of some of
the crops is due to very large shifts in the use of agricultural land whereas the yields are almost
independent of the level of the direct payments extended to the new member states. Relatively
high direct payments to selected crops (modelled as input subsidies to land) will distort the
allocation of the production factors, including the use of land. Important for understanding this
result is also the assumption that there are no - in economic terms - effective restrictions on the
reallocation of land at the individual farm level.
Enlarging the EU to include the CEECs in the present CAP is an expensive option in
budgetary terms. It is found that if direct payments are extended in their full amounts to the
new members the level of CAP related expenditures could increase by one third. The analysis
also shows that if direct payments are reduced by one-third prior to enlargement, the impact on
the EU budget will approximately correspond to a situation in which the direct payments were
not extended to the CEECs, but the 'old' EU members retain their access to the current pay-
ments (a two tier CAP). In other words, the CAP expenditure level could be hold within the
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present maximum rate of funding for the EU's CAP activities, if reforms are in place prior to
enlargement.
In spite of these relatively high budgetary costs the current EU countries are estimated to
lose no more than approximately 0.1% of their national income. Overall economic welfare
improves significantly in the Central and Eastern European Countries following accession.
The gains for these countries amount to an annual welfare increase of 1 to 3% depending on
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Table A.1 Protection and output subsidies, EU15, percentage (levels)
Import tariff equivalent Export subsidies Output subsidies
  
1995 2010 1995 2010 1995 2010
levels levels levels levels levels levels
Wheat 12.4 12.4 12.4 0.0 6.2 6.2
Other grains 44.2 44.2 44.2 22.6 5.0 5.0
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 5.6 5.5 5.5 -0.9 1.0 1.0
Oilseeds 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 8.9
Sugar cane and beet 76.6 76.6 76.6 76.6 -2.7 -2.7
Other crops 9.0 8.9 8.9 -0.2 0.4 0.3
Bovine animals 111.2 75.6 75.6 68.9 6.3 6.3
Other animal products 0.8 0.9 0.9 18.7 9.0 9.0
Raw milk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 8.9
Wool 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.9 26.0
Fish 4.9 2.7 2.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6
Resource extraction 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.6 0.5
Bovine meat products 111.2 75.6 75.6 68.9 0.6 0.6
Other meat products 18.7 18.7 18.7 18.7 0.7 0.6
Vegetable oils and fats 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
Dairy products 116.3 116.1 116.1 83.9 1.0 1.0
Sugar 76.6 76.6 76.6 76.6 0.8 0.8
Other processed foods 9.8 9.8 9.8 0.6 1.0 1.0
Beverages and tobacco 20.4 20.7 20.7 -0.8 -24.2 -24.0
Manufactures 4.1 3.8 3.8 -0.4 -2.1 -2.1












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3. Modelling the impact of WTO negotiations on EU
agriculture: an application of the GTAP model
Joseph Francois
3.1 Introduction
This paper uses a modified version of the GTAP model and dataset to examine the impact of a
new set of multilateral agriculture negotiations, for EU agriculture, but also more broadly for
the European Union and for its trading partners. Negotiations in agriculture and services under
the aegis of the WTO are supposed to be undertaken anyway as part of the Uruguay Round
Agreements. However, it is not clear if these negotiations will remain sectoral efforts, or if
they might eventually be subsumed as part of a broader effort aimed at goods and services.
The aim of this paper is to use the model to shed some light on possible implications of
future multilateral agriculture liberalisation, both for the EU and other developed WTO Mem-
bers, and also for developing countries. It is the developing countries in particular that have
been vocal about their opposition to further trade-liberalisation efforts. For example, the poor-
est countries have expressed genuine concern that further agriculture negotiations will lead to
an erosion in their real incomes. (At the end of the Uruguay Round, this became a major last
minute obstacle). It merits examination of the extent to which negotiations in other sectors
might be used to compensate for these losses.
The paper is organised as follows. Before embarking on an assessment of the impact of a
new multilateral round of trade negotiations, it makes sense to first revisit the last one. The
Uruguay Round (UR) will not be fully implemented until 2005. While many industrial tariff
commitments are now in place, implementation of one of the more problematic parts of the
UR agreements, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) has largely been deferred un-
til the very end of this period. In addition, in a number of developing countries, the
commitments made on tariff bindings (the bound most-favoured nation or MFN rate) are so
loose that there may be little scope for actual tariff reductions through negotiated reduction in
bound rates in future rounds. This next two sections are concerned with the scope for market
access negotiations in the next multilateral trade round, and how they will be shaped by the re-
sults of the last one. This includes a discussion of tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) and related
agricultural policy issues. This is followed by an overview of the database and model structure
in section 3.4. Finally, we apply the model in section 3.5 to examine the impact of multilateral
liberalisation in agriculture on European agriculture and the EU economy more broadly de-
fined.
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3.2 A hitchhiker's guide to the post-UR agriculture policy landscape
Dirty Tariffication and TRQs
Under the Uruguay Round, market accessibility was to be made more transparent by convert-
ing a plethora of non-tariff import barriers to tariffs. This process is referred to as
'tariffication'. Under tariffication, new and existing tariffs were to be bound and reduced on
average by 36% over a 6-year implementation period. Unfortunately, the process of tariffica-
tion was complicated by loose interpretation of the relevant guidelines. As a result, OECD
countries exhibited a tendency to grossly overstate actual levels of protection, to ensure that
they could avoid any real liberalisation in those sectors. This process was called dirty tariffi-
cation. As a result of dirty tariffication (and combined with the possibility of uneven tariff
cuts), the extent of liberalisation is especially limited in highly protected 'sensitive' products.
As a result the most protected commodities, such as sugar and dairy products, were liberalised
the least.
Figure 3.1 EU protection for wheat, 1979 through 1993
49
To illustrate this point, figure 3.1 offers a comparison of average European Union pro-
tection over the 1979-1993 period (through the end of the Uruguay Round), and the bound rate
actually set by the European Union. The European Union's final bound rate is an estimated ef-
fective rate of around 82%, while the average applied rate for the previous 15 years had been
56%. To ensure that dirty tariffication during the UR did not actually lead to 'trade liberalisa-
tion' wherein we actually realised less trade instead of more, the URAA embedded the tariff
components of market access commitments into a parallel set of commitments on current ac-
cess and minimum access. Current access commitments, made in quantity terms, were
portrayed to those outside agriculture negotiating circles (i.e. the public) as ensuring that there
would not be an erosion in effective market access as a result of the URAA. At the same time,
some liberalisation was to be guaranteed through minimum access commitments, set at 5% of
1986-88 consumption levels. The combination of the two leads directly to quantitative com-
mitments (and quantitative restrictions) on market access. These are managed through tariff-
rate quotas.
Tariff-rate quotas are, in effect, a two-tiered tariff system. Up to the quota level, a rela-
tively low tariff is charged. Above this level, a high (and often prohibitive) tariff is charged.
Depending on the level of these tariffs and the level of trade, substantial rents can be tied to in-
quota imports. The quota levels themselves are determined by current and minimum access
commitments.
In theory, while current access commitments could be allocated on a bilateral basis,
minimum access commitments should have been allocated on an MFN (i.e. non-
discriminatory or most-favoured nation) basis. In practice, there is typically no distinction
between the two regimes in national tariff schedules. Up to the total access (current and mini-
mum) quota levels, we tend to find a within-quota tariff in national tariff schedules, with
imports above this access level, or outside the quota, typically assessed a higher tariff. In cases
where the out of quota rate is prohibitive but the quota is largely filled, we in effect have a
strict quota system for food imports.
The sharing of the relevant quota rents is determined by how the quotas are allocated,
and by the in-quota tariff rates. Where the out-of-quota rates are not prohibitive, the two-tiered
tariff structure still creates quota rents and all of the political economy considerations associ-
ated with rent seeking (and well known from our experience with the Multi-Fibre
Arrangement). In yet other cases, the in-quota tariff rate is so high that exports are below the
quota levels (i.e. market access has eroded since the end of the UR), and the in-quota tariff rate
is the binding constraint. In contrast to the regime for textiles and clothing, wherein trade re-
strictions were largely a North-South issue, in agriculture TRQs have been employed by both
developed and developing countries. Hence, the implied quota rent transfers are potentially a
drain on incomes in both developed and developing food importers.
An important reason why quotas are unfilled in this new regime is the way quotas are
allocated. While access commitments were supposed to be MFN based, silent deals were
sometimes struck wherein quota allocations were awarded to key suppliers during bilateral ne-
gotiations. As a result, in practice these quotas often are purely bilateral. In addition, the
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bilateral nature of these quotas has been reinforced by liberal interpretation of the rules. For
example, in the case of the EU, there has been an explicit assertion that expanded access for
Central and East Europeans under the Associate Agreements will be counted against overall
access commitments. On net, we now have a system where protection of politically sensitive
agricultural products is often bilateral, and involves quota rents. For other products, we have
seen a move toward a price-based system, though one sometimes characterised by very high
tariff bindings.
Export competition
In the case of export promotion (i.e. export supports), the changes in the rules were less strong,
though the direct trade effects may be more significant. Export subsidies were to be reduced
both in terms of expenditure and of volume. The allowed expenditure was to fall by 36%, and
the volume by 21%. Although the definition of export subsidies contained in the URAA is
fairly rigorous, the definitions of commodities are not. Countries declared commodity aggre-
gates instead of individual tariff lines, which allowed them more flexibility with regard to
export supports. For example, the EU included some 40 products as coarse grain.
Although the export subsidy commitments have been cited as one of the most important
achievements of the round, it should be noted that trade in many products will continue to be
heavily distorted at the end of the implementation period.
Domestic support
In theory, transfers to producers through domestic support programs were also limited and had
to be reduced by 20%. The domestic support level is measured by an Aggregate Measurement
of Support (AMS) defined within the URAA. In practice, the definition of the AMS means
that the constraint on any particular commodity is slight. In addition, it was agreed that meas-
ures with a minimal impact on trade could be used freely. These 'green box' measures include
government services such as research, disease control, infrastructure, and food security. They
also include payments made directly to farmers that do not stimulate production, such as cer-
tain forms of direct income support, assistance to help farmers restructure agriculture, and
direct payments under environmental and regional assistance programmes. Finally, the USA
and the EU also agreed during the negotiations on a 'blue box' category of policies, which, al-
though production neutral, are coupled with supply reduction instruments.
Though countries committed to cut their market price support in the URAA, they have
actually engaged in a game of shifting the support (at least partly) into the forms that are al-
lowed in 'green' and 'blue' categories. A good example of this is CAP reforms where measures
affecting market prices have been transformed into animal and land premiums that are fixed to
given number of animals or fixed amount of land. Another is the recent pattern of annual




The European Union, like many of its trading partners, has implemented TRQs (or reserved
the right to implement them) for a wide range of products. Data on TRQ quota levels, alloca-
tions, and in and out of quota tariff rates is important to any assessment of future negotiated
liberalisation in products affected by TRQs. For this reason, the U.S. Agriculture Department,
the European Commission, the Food and Agricultural Organisation, the OECD Secretariat,
and UNCTAD have launched a joint database initiative called the Agricultural Market Access
Database (AMAD). The goal is to make detailed data on agricultural trade and policy avail-
able over the Internet. The database currently contains information on TRQ regimes in 30
countries.
Table 3.1 EU Dairy TRQs
TRQID Description Bound Actual Actual Unfilled Quota Value
Quantity Quantity Import Quota Fill shares
(tons) (tons) value Rate
EEC71 Skimmed Milk Powders 68,000 50,682 90,332 17,318 0.75 0.10
EEC72 Butter 76,667 71,894 211,912 4,773 0.94 0.25
EEC73, 74 Emmentaler, Gruyere,
Sbrinz 23,600 45,973 373,983 -22,373 1.95 0.43
EEC75 Cheddar 15,000 15,562 50,620 -562 1.04 0.06
EEC76 Cheese for processing 20,000 5,075 20,642 14,925 0.25 0.02
EEC77 Pizza Cheese 5,300 345 1,291 4,955 0.07 0.00
EEC78 Other Cheese 19,500 16,224 68,312 3,276 0.83 0.08
Unbound Dairy NA 48,363 46,450 NA NA 0.05
As illustration, figure 3.2 summarises data from AMAD for dairy imports from the
European Union. Over 95% of dairy imports, by value, are covered by scheduled quantity
commitments. Of these, the full butter quota has been allocated exclusively to New Zealand,
while a share of the Cheddar Cheese quota has been allocated to New Zealand, Australia, and
Canada.
From the data in figure 3.2, it is clear that different items within the dairy regime are af-
fected differently by TRQs. For butter and cheddar cheese, 31% of all imports by value, the
system operates as a strict quota regime, with quota rents accruing and the out of quota tariff
being prohibitive. For skimmed milk powders, cheese for processing, other cheese, and pizza
cheese, the in-quota tariff is so high that import quota levels (based on current access com-
mitments, or Uruguay Round base imports) are not met, so that there has been an erosion of
market access since the Uruguay Round base period. These products account for 21% of im-
ports by value. If we throw in the unbound products, then roughly 26% of dairy imports are
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under a strict tariff regime. The remainder, 43%, involves Emmentaler, Gruyere, Sbrinz
cheese and related products. These products fall into yet another category, where imports are
well above quota levels, implying that the out of quota tariff is the binding constraint (and that
quota rents also accrue on roughly half of imports). Further detail on the TRQ regime for dairy
is illustrated in figure 3.2. This figure highlights the pattern of filled, unfilled, and overfilled
import quotas.
Figure 3.2 Dairy Quotas for the EU (1995 imports in quantity terms)
3.3 The market access landscape beyond agriculture
Industrial tariffs
An important feature of the policy landscape left by the UR agreements is tariff bindings on
industrial goods. It is useful to remember that tariff negotiations in the WTO are not actually
about applied tariff rates, but rather tariff 'bindings'. Tariff bindings are commitments not to
raise tariffs above a certain level (see Francois and Martin, 2000). In the case of OECD indus-
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trial tariffs, there is a close correspondence between applied and bound rates. This is not the
case for developing countries. In particular, for developing countries (and also for Australia)
the industrial tariff landscape features bound rates often well above applied rates. For the
poorest developing countries, tariffs are often completely unbound.
Under the UR, the share of developing country imports of industrial products subject to
tariff bindings rose from 13 to 61% (Blackhurst et al. 1996). This rise was mainly due to
commitments by Latin American countries to apply ceiling bindings on 100% of tariff lines,
and commitments made by Asian developing economies. Some of the Latin American bind-
ings pre-date the end of the UR. Chile was the only developing country that offered to bind
100% of its tariff lines in the context of the Tokyo Round, while Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Mexico and Venezuela bound 100% of tariff lines upon accession to GATT during the period
1986-1991. Among Asian developing economies, Indonesia bound more than 90% of tariff
lines during the UR. India, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thai-
land bound between 60 and 89%. Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe bound less than 15%. Where
developing economies had bound all or a significant portion of tariffs prior to the end of the
Uruguay Round (Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico and Venezuela), the Uruguay Round
tariff commitments often reflected a decline in ceiling rates (rather than applied rates). For
these reasons, implementation of Uruguay Round tariff commitments by developing countries
has involved virtually no declines in current applied tariffs. This means that, to the extent re-
ductions have occurred since the end of the UR, they have been undertaken for reasons
unrelated to WTO commitments.
What is important for future industrial tariff negotiations is the current level of ceiling
bindings vis-à-vis applied rates and the limited scope of bindings coverage. Taken together,
the combination of bound and applied rates means that developing countries will, collectively,
be able to reduce bound rates (or introduce them for the first time) while having to make only
modest (and in many cases no) changes to applied rates. For example, for most developing
countries in the table, a 20% reduction in average bound rates could be accomplished without
any actual reduction in average applied rates. Hence, for industrial tariffs, the relevant scenar-
ios for the next round are likely to involve little or no reduction in many developing country
applied tariffs. This will be true whether or not developing countries take an active part in fu-
ture industrial tariff negotiations. As in previous rounds, there is a good chance that only
OECD countries will actually reduce industrial tariffs as part of any upcoming industrial tariff
negotiations.
While they did not affect current applied rates, ceiling bindings were considered impor-
tant enough that countries which agreed to bind previously unbound tariffs during the UR
were given 'negotiating credit' for the decision even if the tariff was bound at a level well
above the currently applied level. For countries (like India) that have implemented further re-
forms since, the issue will come up again in future tariff negotiations. Regardless of how they
are treated (and though they are an integral part of the tariff negotiations) reductions in ceiling
bindings clearly are more akin to rules and procedures - in terms of their contribution to the
predictability of future market access - than to direct increases in market access.
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For the industrial countries, average tariffs are now 3% of less. However, there are im-
portant exceptions. These include motor vehicles in the EU, and textiles and clothing in the
EU and United States and Japan. This is illustrated in figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3 Tri-country tariff rates
Services
Finally, we turn to the issue of market access in the service sectors. From the outset, service
negotiations have been 'qualitative'. They have not targeted numeric measures, but rather
commitments in the cross-border movement of consumers and providers and the establishment
of foreign providers. As a result, efforts to quantify market access in service sectors (a basic
requirement if we want to then quantify liberalisation) have been problematic at best. The
standard approach (an example is Hoekman, 1995) has been to produce inventory measures.
As an alternative perspective, figure 3.4 presents estimates of 'tariff equivalents' for
services trade. These are based on a simple gravity model, estimated from detailed U.S. trade
data for services trade in 1997 (the basic approach is described in Francois 2000 -- annex C).
The estimates are for two categories, (i) business, business, and other intermediate services,
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and (ii) construction. The estimates are admittedly crude. The pattern that emerges is consis-
tent with that for industrial tariffs. It appears that barriers to services trade are higher (often
much higher) in developing countries than in the OECD. Hence, as in the case of industrial
tariffs, the effects of further GATS negotiations will hinge critically on developing country
participation or non-participation, and the extent to which they commit to actual liberalisation
rather than stand-stills (the qualitative equivalent of ceiling bindings).
Figure 3.4 Tariff equivalents for services
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3.4 The Model and Data
This section provides a brief overview of the global computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model used in this study. The model is based on the GTAP model (see Hertel, 1996).
It is characterised by an input-output structure (based on regional and national input-
output tables) that explicitly links industries in a value added chain from primary goods, over
continuously higher stages of intermediate processing, to the final assembling of goods and
services for consumption.
Inter-sectoral linkages are direct, like the input of steel in the production of transport
equipment, and indirect, via intermediate use in other sectors. The model captures these link-
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Figure 3.5 Model Sector Scheme
The most important aspects of the model can be summarised as follows: (i) it covers all
world trade and production; (ii) it allows for imperfect competition (oligopoly); (iii) it includes
intermediate linkages between sectors; (iv) and it allows for trade to affect capital stocks
through investment effects. The last point means we model medium to long-run investment ef-
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fects. The inclusion of imperfect competition implies agglomeration effects like those empha-
sised in the recent economic geography literature. Some of these model features, in particular
(ii) and (iv), represent departures from the core GTAP model (see Francois et al. 1996, Fran-
cois, 1998, Francois, 2000, Baldwin and Francois, 1999).
Imperfect competition as modelled, but is not directly important for agriculture, but is
for interaction between agricultural liberalisation and liberalisation in other sectors, and for
relationships between agriculture and processed foods. We include it here to keep the model as
close as possible to actual industrial structure.
The effects of the CAP are captured through its impact on relative prices and output lev-
els in the base data. A detailed treatment of the CAP has not been implemented for this
application.
Social accounting data are drawn directly from the Global Trade Analysis Project
(GTAP) version 4 dataset (GTAP 1999). The GTAP version 4 dataset is benchmarked to 1995,
and includes detailed national input-output, trade, and final demand structures. The basic so-
cial accounting and trade data are supplemented with trade policy data, including additional
data on tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Data on post-Uruguay Round tariffs are taken from re-
cent estimates reported by Francois and Strutt (1999).
These are taken primarily from the WTO's integrated database, with supplemental in-
formation from the World Bank's recent assessment of detailed pre- and post-Uruguay Round
tariff schedules. All of this tariff information has been concorded to GTAP model sectors.
Services trade barriers are based on Francois (2000). The social accounting data have been ag-
gregated to 19 sectors and 12 regions. The sectors and regions for the 19x9 aggregation of the
data are detailed in figure 3.5.
While the basic GTAP dataset is benchmarked to 1995, and reflects applied tariffs actu-
ally in place in 1995, we of course want to work with a representation of a post- Uruguay
Round world. To accomplish this, before conducting any policy experiments we first run a
'pre-experiment' in which we implement the rest of the Uruguay Round. As such, the dataset
we work with for actual experiments is a representation of a notional world economy (with
values in 1995 dollars) wherein we have full Uruguay Round implementation.
3.5 Experiments and Results
Experiments
We turn now to a description of the experiments. The experiments are described in figure 3.6.
These involve 20 and 50% cuts in trade barriers. There are 2 sets of these experiments. One
involves only agricultural liberalisation (agriculture in isolation). The other involves a broad
liberalisation scenario (as described in Francois, 2000), where our notional agricultural liber-
alisation takes place in the context of a broad multilateral round. We focus on a number of
issues: the impact of multilateral liberalisation on European agricultural production and trade;
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the overall impact on the European economy; and the implications for European trading part-
ners. This last issue targets concerns about net food importers. Concerns about food importers
are a potential block to multilateral agricultural liberalisation. However, they may be less of a
problem if compensation for terms-of-trade losses in agriculture can be offered through other
trade liberalisations.
Note that we do not examine TRQs explicitly. The reason is that, in the context of ag-
gregate sectors, detailed TRQ workings are lost. Like the textile and clothing quotas, we might
at first glance expect to be able to work with an 'aggregate' treatment of TRQs within broad
agricultural product categories. However, there is a critical difference.
In the case of textiles and clothing, there is only one relevant instrument (a quota). We
can therefore hold a straight face while modelling aggregate quotas.
Experiments Issues
20% agriculture-only liberalisation
 (a 20% reduction in tax equivalent of all
 border measures)
50% agriculture-only liberalisation
 (a 50% reduction in tax equivalent of all
 border measures)
20% liberalisation across agriculture, in-
dustry, and services.
50% liberalisation across agriculture, in-
dustry, and services.
The impact on European agricultural
Sectors
The overall impact on the European econ-
omy
The overall impact on EU trading partners
Figure 3.6 Experiments and issues
In agriculture, this is not the case. For example, the case of dairy products in section 2
illustrates how, within broad product categories, the detailed nature of individual TRQ regimes
can be lost within aggregates. In this case, this also means that quantitative analysis that seeks
to treat TRQs seriously must also deal with detailed (6- or 8-digit) tariff categories for the
relevant products, as we are working with different regimes for different products. The alter-
native is to continue working in the tradition of stylised protection measures for aggregate
categories. Progress is underway to map the GTAP database to more detailed information on
TRQs. Even then, we should link TRQs through satellite models of individual products (like
cheddar cheese and dried skim milk) to really track TRQ-related constraints. This is simply
beyond the scope of this paper.
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3.6 Estimated Effects
We next turn to a description of our simulation results. These are summarised in figures 3.7,
3.8 and 3.9 and tables 3.2 and 3.3. Except as noted, all changes are in % differences in the
counterfactural.
Agricultural performance
We focus first on agricultural performance. These results are summarised in figures 3.7, 3.8
and 3.9. Note that we have changes reported for output, exports, and prices (in 1995 dollars).
Generally, for output levels, it does not matter much whether or not liberalisation takes
place in the context of other negotiations. The output responses are roughly comparable, with
rice, sugars, and natural fibers being the most sensitive in terms of output levels. There is a
slight modification of output effects under broad liberalisation. For example, under the 20%
scenario, we have a -3.4% change in natural fiber production when only agriculture is liberal-
ised, but only a -2.2% change in the context of broader liberalisation.
Figure 3.7 Changes in output for EU agriculture (%)
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Turning next to exports, the results are more mixed. Some sectors, like oilseeds, are
squeezed at home, forcing them to increase exports. For other sectors, like cereals, the fall in
exports maps to a corresponding fall in output. The only changes that flip sign between narrow
and broad scenarios are in natural fibers. Under the broad scenario, the domestic textile and
clothing industry is squeezed by tariff reductions. At the same time, there is expanded produc-
tion abroad. This draws exports from the EU, so that natural fiber exports rise under the broad
liberalisation scenarios (0.6 and 6.4%).
Figure 3.8 Changes in prices for EU agriculture (%)
Finally, consider the impact on domestic prices. This is presented in figure 3.9. Here, we
see more significant differences between scenarios, with the direction of price changes de-
pending for both oilseeds and vegetables on the scope of the scenario. Significantly, all
negative pressures o EU agricultural prices are moderated in the context of broad liberalisa-
tion. With broad liberalisation, increased incomes exert enough pressure to pull prices up
somewhat from the depressed levels that follow from agriculture-only liberalisation. This sug-
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gests that price support schemes could be more easily maintained under a broad liberalisation,
because of income-demand linkages.
Figure 3.9 Changes in exports for EU agriculture (%)
EU macroeconomic indicators
We turn next to EU macro indicators. These are summarised in table 3.2. Here, we obviously
see greater differences between scenarios as we move to the macro level. This is because we
have liberalisation of industrial and service barriers. The income effects provide some rough
metric of the relative importance of agriculture in a broad multilateral round. From the table,
agriculture would be a source for between 22 and 28% of the total gains to be realised from a
broad multilateral round. The same weighting holds for wage changes. It is clear that, for la-
bour, agricultural liberalisation is relatively unimportant. The discernible wage gains result
from the broad scenarios.
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Table 3.2 Macro Effects for the EU
20% agricultural 50% agricultural 20% broad 50% broad
liberalisation liberalisation liberalisation liberalisation
percent changes
terms of trade 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.07
equivalent variation (%) 0.06 0.15 0.30 0.54
real unskilled wages 0.06 0.16 0.47 0.96
real skilled wages 0.10 0.24 0.50 1.02
million dollar changes
national income (EV based) 4,298.95 9,909.70 19,616.64 35,946.30
Trading Partners
Finally, we turn to the impact of our liberalisation scenarios on EU trading partners. As noted
at the opening of this section, there is particular concern (among NGOs, UNCTAD, and tc)
about the impact of agricultural policy on developing countries. These concerns are supported
by the results shown in table 3.3. Under the narrow liberalisation scenarios, we have net wel-
fare losses for the former Soviet Union, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Rest of World (of course,
for all of these regions, poor domestic policy and agricultural infrastructure play in a critical
role in this result). These results are reversed, qualitatively, once we move to a broad round.
Yes, we can expect losers from agricultural liberalisation, particularly in the world's poorest
countries. However, this is more than compensated for if liberalisation is expanded to include
manufactures and services.
Table 3.3 National Welfare Effects (%)
20% agricultural 50% agricultural 20% broad 50% broad
liberalisation liberalisation liberalisation liberalisation
European Union 0.06 0.15 0.30 0.54
Japan 0.09 0.18 0.38 0.72
ASEAN 0.18 0.43 2.25 3.98
India 0.08 0.16 0.90 2.23
United States 0.00 0.01 0.25 0.43
Brazil 0.07 0.16 0.35 1.19
Central America 0.09 0.26 0.89 1.60
Central European Associates 0.03 0.08 0.62 1.26
Former Soviet Union -0.07 -0.19 0.57 1.01
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.03 -0.07 0.68 1.24
Rest of Africa -0.13 -0.32 0.67 1.27
Rest of World 0.03 0.05 1.16 1.98
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4. The agenda 2000 CAP reform, world prices and URAA
GATT-WTO export constraints
Hans van Meijl and Frank van Tongeren
4.1 Introduction
At the European Summit in Berlin, 26 March 1999, the EU Heads of States reached agreement
on the Agenda 2000 package, which contains reforms of the European Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP). This paper discusses whether and to what extent the reform package contributes
to fulfilment of the EU's commitments on reduction of export subsidies made under the earlier
GATT Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. Furthermore, we obtain a quantitative as-
sessment of the effects of alternative world market price developments on the fulfilment of
these commitments.
We use a modified version of the GTAP model and its database to reflect the essentials
of the EU Common Agricultural Policy and the Agenda 2000 reforms. Our modifications fol-
low recommendations made in Veenendaal (et al. 2000), who assessed the usefulness of
GTAP for CAP reform analysis. We introduce new equations and new variables to represent
the EU's price insulation from world markets, and we include an explicit modelling of inter-
vention (floor) prices.. We also introduce set-aside rates in the EU's cereal sectors and a milk
production quota system in the EU's dairy sector. In addition, we make some modifications to
the database in order to achieve an improved representation of compensation payments.
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) in 1994 had a major impact on
the EU's CAP policy, as domestic farm policies have become subject to international govern-
ance through the GATT. The set of rules established under the GATT limits the scope for
domestic agricultural- and trade policies. Specifically, the agreement had implications in three
areas: market access, export competition and domestic support. Of these, the constraints on the
value of export subsidy expenditures and on the volume of subsidised exports are expected to
become most pressing. Binding constraints on export subsidies imply that insulation of EU
markets from world markets is more difficult because some excess supply cannot be disposed
on world markets at reduced prices. The reduction of intervention prices under the Mac Sharry
and Agenda 2000 reforms allow the EU to meet the exports constraints more easily (for a
summary of Agenda 2000, see Veenendaal, et al. 2000). The paper is structured as follows.
Section 4.2 gives a summary of the Agenda 2000 reform package and it provides some data on
the degree to which the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture export subsidy reduction
commitments are binding for the EU. Section 4.3 gives some theoretical background on the
relationship between price insulation and export subsidies, and it discusses a price transmis-
sion mechanism between intervention prices and market prices. The implementation of
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Agenda 2000 in the GTAP model is discussed in section 4.4, and section 4.5 provides quanti-
tative numerical results. Finally, section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Agenda 2000 reforms and export subsidy commitments
4.2.1 Agenda 2000 reforms
The Agenda 2000 reforms, which basically continue along the same lines as the earlier Mac
Sharry reforms (1992), have been prompted by a combination of factors. First, the envisaged
enlargement of the EU by a number of Central and East European Countries (CEECs). Their
relatively high share of agriculture in production would lead to unsustainable budget implica-
tions for the EU. In addition, given a large share of food in CEECs household expenditures,
the current high EU food prices would bear severe consequences for households.
Figure 4.1 Summary of agenda 2000 reforms
Second, the anticipation of a new round of trade negotiations under auspices of the WTO
is expected to generate the need for further adjustments in the CAP. Third, and foremost,
without reforms, the EU would not be able to fulfil its earlier commitments made under the
Uruguay round agreement. Specifically, surpluses in grains and beef have been expected to
emerge, which could not be disposed on world markets without violation of the UR agree-
ment. Although Agenda 2000 in itself implies only minor changes it continues the
fundamental swing of European agricultural policy set in motion by the 1992 Mac Sharry
Product Measure Implementation
Cereals 15% price decrease 2000 minus 7.5%; 2001 minus 15%
Compensation increases from € 54.34/ton to € 63.00/ton
Reduction of area set-aside Compulsory set-aside from 15% to 10%, extraordinary
set-aside abolished, voluntary set-aside maintained
Oilseeds A decrease of compensation Compensation payments will be equal to those for
payments cereals: a decrease from € 94.24/ton to € 63.00/ton
Milk 15% price decrease 2005 minus 5%; 2006 minus 10%; 2007 minus 15%
Compensations for beef and milk price decreases
1.5% linear increase of milk In 3 years from 2005 onwards (0.5% a year)
quota
0.9% increase of milk quota Italy, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Northern Ireland.1.39
through specific allocations million tons, in two unequal stages in 2000/01 and
2001/02
Beef 20% price decrease 2000 minus 6.7%; 2001 minus 13.3%; 2002 minus 20%
Compensations per head and slaughter premiums
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policy reform from market price support towards direct income support. Figure 4.2 summa-
rises the policy measures for the most relevant products 1.
For cereals, the agreement specifies a reduction of the intervention price by 15% (to be
achieved in two steps by 2001/2002). The price decrease will be partially compensated
through direct payments to farmers, which are expected to compensate for about 50% of the
income drop. This is achieved by area payments, which result from the multiplication of his-
toric reference yields with fixed money amounts per tonne. The set-aside area is reduced from
its Mac Sharry levels. Note that the policy measures do not differentiate between foodgrains
and feedgrains, hence maintaining the practice of equalising the intervention price levels for
both types of grains, whereas there is a clear price differential on international markets. For
oilseeds and protein crops, which do not have a fixed intervention price, similar area payments
continue to exist, but these payments are to be reduced over time. The compulsory set-aside of
10% of arable land is retained, and the compensation occurs according to identical rates for all
arable crops.
In addition, farmers can opt for voluntary set-aside. In the dairy sector, the intervention
prices for skimmed milk powder and butter will be reduced by 15% in three steps from
2005/2006 onwards. The milk quota regime is extended to 2008, and the quota will be in-
creased by 1.5% over three years in Member States from 2005/2006 onwards 2. To compensate
for the fall in dairy prices, farmers receive payments related to their historic quota holdings.
Additional compensation is offered through 'national envelopes' allocated to member states to
compensate dairy farmers. Note that part of the quota increase precedes the fall in intervention
prices, which implies that existing problems with regard to meeting the URAA constraints on
subsidised dairy exports will only be harder to meet 3. The quota regime is due to be reviewed
in 2003. The intervention price for beef and veal is to be reduced by 20% in three steps over
the period 2000/2002. Compensatory premiums are related to the number of animals and there
also are slaughter premiums. The total number of animals qualifying for special premium and
suckler cow premium are limited to two (standard) livestock units per hectare. Additional
premiums are granted if the number of livestock falls below 1.4 units per hectare.
                                                
1 We leave aside other elements of the reform package that deal with integrated rural development, as the second
pillar of the CAP, and we leave aside environmental and farm employment policy measures. A complete descrip-
tion of the agricultural chapter of Agenda 2000 is found in European Commission CAP 2000 series of the DG-
Agri (http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg06/index.htm).
2 Except Italy, Greece, Spain, Ireland and Northern Ireland. For these countries, specific quota increases totalling
1.39 million tons are to be implemented in two unequal stages in 2000/01 and 2001/02 already. The two measures
will lead at the end of the implementation period (over the next eight years) to a quota rise of approximately
2.4%.
3 In fact in the second half of the year 1999 EU milk prices already declined significantly due to the impossibility
to dispose surplusses at subsidised prices on world markets.
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4.2.2 The European Union's export subsidy commitments
Under the GATT-URAA in 1994, both a reduction in the value of export budget expenditures
by 36% over 6 years, and a reduction on the volumes of subsidised export by 21% over 6
years have been agreed. Despite the positive effects of the 1992 CAP reforms, which led to
lower EU domestic guaranteed prices, there is still ample reason for concern, as figure 4.2 and
figure 4.3 illustrate. If the market situation of 1997/98 were repeated in the year 2000, then the
volume of subsidised exports for 7 commodities (Poultry meat, cheese, eggs, beef, other milk
products, wine and sugar) would be beyond their year 2000 GATT bounds, while the export
subsidy budget would be exceeded for 4 commodities (processed products, other milk prod-
ucts, sugar and alcohol) 1. It is apparent that many products are exceeding, or are close to, their
year 2000 GATT bounds 2.
Figure 4.2 EU volume of subsidised exports 1995/96 and 1997/98 as ratio to WTO commitments in 2000
Source: WTO notifications.
                                                
1 It should also be noted that the EUR/USD exchange rate has an impact on the fill rate of subsidy bounds. A
lower exchange rate reduces the USD denominated value of the export subsidies. The declining value of the EUR
relative to the USD during the year 2000 has contributed to a slackening of the export subsidy constraints that the
EU is facing.
2 It should be noted that up to the year 2000 it was possible to carry over unused subsidies and exports of the pre-
vious year. In the year 2000 this is not possible anymore.
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These figures also reveal several other noteworthy phenomena. First, there is a large
variability observed in both indicators. Both the volume and the value constraints have be-
come less binding for a number of products, while other products have come dangerously
close to the constraints, or are even exceeding it 1. Dairy products (especially cheese, but not
butter) and beef products, are clearly among the group of products for which export subsidy
constraints are a problem. While wheat and coarse grains have stayed clear of both constraints
over the period considered, the volume of subsidised exports has nevertheless been increasing.
While cereals world prices have been rather high, EU cereals prices had already declined sub-
stantially following the Mac Sharry reforms. These two factors combine to alleviate the
restriction on the export subsidy budget, as the gap between cereals world prices and EU
prices has been diminishing. It should also be noted that pig- and poultry meat, as well as fruit
and vegetables are clearly giving reasons for concern in terms of export subsidy commitments.
Figure 4.3 EU export subsidy budget 1995/96 and 1997/98 as ratio to WTO commitments in 2000
Source: WTO notifications.
                                                
1 Obviously, there are no reduction commitments with respect to processed products, but the value of subsidies is
related to the subsidy content of the inputs used in processing.
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Second, the volume constraints seem generally to be more 'sticky' than the budget con-
straints. The value constraints display a larger variation which can be attributed to the fact that
the size of the budget depends on both a volume component (the volume of exports) and a
price component (the price differential between the EU and the international export markets).
The price component is clearly more volatile. The volume component of exports subsidies de-
clines at a much slower rate, if at all, which is explained by slower adjustments of production
levels. Third, while the sugar sector remains outside the Agenda 2000 reforms, the amount of
subsidised exports and the subsidy budget have both been rising beyond their year 2000 com-
mitment levels.
4.3 Theory
4.3.1 Price insulation and export bounds
The Agenda 2000 reform package generates indirect effects on world markets, which will de-
pend on a) the reaction of domestic demand to lower prices; b) the reaction of EU farmers to
the policy package, i.e. the supply response, and c) the reaction of world markets to changed
net supply from the EU. Leaving aside the compensation payments to farmers and leaving
aside reductions in set-aside requirements, a lower intervention price will lead to a contraction
of production, as market prices will drop (see section 4.2 on the relation between market
prices and intervention prices). On the other hand, lower prices will induce a higher demand
for domestic products, both for final consumption demand and for intermediate demand in
processing industries. These two effects will combine to reduce the net exports of the EU, i.e.
the net supply of EU to world markets. This lower supply on world markets will lead to up-
ward pressure on world prices, especially for products where the EU has a significant world
market share, and where demand is relatively price inelastic.
As a consequence, the export subsidy that is required to bridge the gap between high EU
prices and world prices will decline. In fact there are three factors contributing to this: a) the
volume component declines because there is less export supply forthcoming, b) the domestic
EU prices are lowered, and therefore move closer to world levels, and c) world prices increase,
and therefore contribute to reducing the price gap. Consequently both GATT constraints be-
come less binding as a result of the drop of guaranteed prices under Agenda 2000.
Compensation payments complicate the picture slightly, because the net effect on the
EU supply response is ambiguous. For cereals, area payments for crops dampen the supply re-
sponse that follows a decrease in the institutional price. The supply curve becomes less elastic
(Swinbank, 1997), and the reduction in production is less than without such payments. In ad-
dition, a decrease in area set-aside obligations, however, implies an increase in production at
each price level. The combined effect of lower intervention prices and increased compensatory
measures on production is indeterminate. See also Van Meijl and Van Tongeren (2000) for a
more elaborate discussion in a partial equilibrium setting. Another effect entering the picture
71
concerns resource shifts between alternative activities. Changes in the relative profitability of
land may induce shifts between alternative cropping and livestock uses.
4.3.2 Cereals intervention prices and domestic market prices
The CAP regime for cereals has always been characterised by a multiple support price system.
A minimum floor price has been installed to stabilise farm prices. The insulation of domestic
prices from world markets could be achieved by variable import levies on the one hand, and
disposal of excess supply on world markets at subsidised prices on the other hand. Under the
old system of variable import levies, the difference between a threshold price and the world
price determined the size of the levy. The threshold price was set high enough to discourage
imports. Although the URAA implied a change in import regimes that abolished the system of
threshold prices and variable levies, the EU is still able to effectively isolate its cereals mar-
kets from world markets (Swinbank 1997). Although under the new system, fixed tariffs per
tonne are applied to imports, there exists a maximum import price equal to the intervention
price plus 55%. The resulting maximum import price initially equalled the old abandoned
threshold price. The import charges are determined by the EU on a 14-day basis for 6 types of
cereals as follows: a reference price is determined taking prices on US grain markets and
adding transport cost to Rotterdam.
The import charge is then equal to the 1.55 x intervention price -/- the reference price. In
practice this system means that the import tariffs are still variable. One consequence of the
import regime is that market prices for cereals have been fluctuating between a ceiling (pre-
URAA: threshold price, post-URAA: intervention price x 1.55) and a floor (intervention
price). Over the years (since 1976) the gap between these two prices has been widening, which
has allowed market prices to be more responsive to market conditions. One empirical regular-
ity is that market prices have been declining towards the intervention price level at times of
increasing net exports, or, to put it differently, at times of increasing excess supply on domes-
tic markets. Many modellers assume a fixed relation between the intervention price and the
market price. Indeed empirical evidence shows that the market price has usually been higher
than the intervention price, but the ratio is certainly not fixed.
In our implementation, we follow Surry (1992) in modelling the transmission endoge-
nously as a function of net-exports in a varying-parameter model. This allows us to investigate
the degree of price transmission. This method also allows us to study two further interesting
price configurations: a) the case when intervention prices are lowered even further than under
Agenda 2000 and below levels that equilibrate domestic supply and demand, b) the case when
world prices are in fact higher than domestic EU prices 1.
                                                
1 The approach is similar in spirit to the method followed in the WATSIM partial equilibrium trade model
(Lampe, 1999). Introducing such a price transmission specification in a general equilibrium model might appear
as an ad-hoc treatment which is not founded micro economically. However, we may refer to Surry (1992) who
rationalises his formulation as the outcome of a decision problem by a central price setting agent. In the empirical
implementation, we use a logistic function, whose two parameters are estimated econometrically.
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See also Van Meijl and Van Tongeren (2000) for a discussion of the model implementa-
tion and the features of the transmission equation.
4.4 Implementation
Standard GTAP model features
Our Agenda 2000 implementation uses a modified version of the GTAP multi-sector multi-
region AGE model, Hertel (1997). This multi-region model allows us to capture inter-country
effects, since the CAP reform influences demand and supply on the world market and there-
fore world market prices, and hence will affect trade flows and welfare. As was argued in
section 4.3, endogenous world market price play a crucial rule for GATT bounds.
In the standard GTAP model each single region is modelled along relatively standard
lines of multi-sector AGE models. All sectors are producing under constant returns to scale,
and perfect competition on factor markets and output markets is assumed. Firms combine in-
termediate inputs and primary factors (land, labour and capital). Intermediate inputs are used
in fixed proportions, but are themselves CES composites of domestic and foreign components.
In addition, the foreign component is differentiated by region of origin (Armington assump-
tion), which permits the modelling of bilateral (intra-industry) trade flows, depending on the
ease of substitution between products from different regions.
Primary factors are combined according to a CES function. Regional endowments of
land, labour and capital are fixed. Labour and capital are perfectly mobile across domestic
sectors. Land, on the other hand, is imperfectly mobile across alternative agricultural uses,
hence sustaining rent differentials. Each region is equipped with one regional household which
distributes income across savings and consumption expenditures according to fixed budget
shares. Consumption expenditures are allocated across commodities according to a non-
homothetic CDE expenditure function.
The model is calibrated to the GTAP version 4 database, which takes 1995 as its bench-
mark equilibrium 1. A distinguishing feature of this data set is the inclusion of bilateral trade
flows and protection databased on WTO data on pre-Uruguay round protection. A drawback
for CAP analysis is that all actual input subsidies are converted into output subsidy equivalents
in the database, see also Veenendaal (et al. 2000). Our implementation of the GTAP model
uses an aggregation that divides the world into eight regions (aggregated from the original 45
GTAP regions), each with eighteen sectors (aggregated form the original 50 sectors), see the
appendix to this chapter for the complete aggregation scheme.
                                                
1 The year 1995 has been characterised by rather high world prices for most agricultural commodities, and as a
consequence the nominal protection rates for OECD countries have historically been rather low. It might therefo-
re be argued that 1995 is not a proper benchmark year for our study. However, any choice of a base year will
always reflect some specific features of that particular year. One solution to this ubiquitous problem in policy
modelling may be the construction of an artificial 'average' benchmark year.
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CAP essentials and deviations from the standard model
To incorporate the main features of the CAP we include the following deviations from the
standard model. First, the domestic market is insulated from world price changes through a
variable import tariff 1. Second, a price transmission mechanism between intervention price
and market price is introduced as described in section 4.2. Price transmission from interven-
tion to market price is dependent on the net-export position (extra-EU trade position). Third, a
variable export subsidy is introduced to dispose excess supply on the world market. Fourth,
some alteration to the database have been made to reflect the fact that subsidies to agriculture
are a combination of input subsidies and output subsidies. The changes to the database are
highlighted below, and follow the lines of earlier GTAP-based CAP model exercises, most
notably Frandsen (et al. 2000).
Agenda 2000
The Agenda 2000 reforms, as summarised in figure 4.1, are implemented as follows:
- Cereals (food- and feedgrains):
A price transmission mechanism is implemented between market and intervention price.
The intervention price is lowered from €119.19 per tonne to €101.31 per tonne. Area
payments are taken out from the output subsidy figures in the original GTAP (v4) data-
base and implemented as a subsidy to value added 2. In the Agenda 2000 simulation the
intervention price is reduced with 15% and compensations payments to inputs are in-
creased to compensate 50% of the income reduction. Furthermore, the set aside rate is
reduced from 15 to 10% 3. Set aside reduction is implemented as a positive factor-neutral
productivity shock, as in Frandsen (et al. 2000).
- Dairy:
We make a distinction between raw milk and dairy products. CAP policies apply to raw
milk, which is essentially non-tradable, whereas trade policies apply to dairy products. A
quota system is introduced in the raw milk sector. Output is fixed and a quota rent is in-
troduced which is accounted as an income flow in the regional household income
                                                
1 In addition to the variable import tariff, we fix the ratio of the domestic market price to the price of the import
composite foreign prices. This eliminates substitution effects between domestic products and imported products.
2 The value of area payments is equal to USD 10,389 million (ECU 13,506 million, source: European Commis-
sion, report 1996). This amount is larger than total land costs in GTAP for all kind of cereals. Therefore we have
introduced area payments as subsidies to value added, and not to land.
3 The assumption that the reduced set aside area is fully utilized for crop production is certainly a bit extreme. In
as far as farmers first take marginal land out of production under a set-aside regime, the slackening of set-aside
rules will not lead to a one-to-one increase in area planted and harvested. In other words, our assumption does not
take into account such 'slippage' effects.
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equation 1. In the Agenda 2000 simulations quota are increased with 1.5% 2. No new
policy measures are introduced in the dairy sector.
- Cattle/beef:
A price transmission mechanism is implemented between market and intervention price,
which drops from €3,475 per tonne (carcass weight, type R3) to €2,7870 per tonne. The
intervention price is introduced in the cattle sector, rather than in the beef sector, be-
cause the intervention price applies at the very unprocessed meat level. We assume a
perfect transmission between intervention and market price, as beef market prices have
historically been on par with intervention prices. Headage payments are partly netted out
from the output subsidy in the original database and are implemented as a subsidy to
capital. Slaughter premiums are considered as output subsidy, while suckler cow premi-
ums are introduced as capital subsidy in the cattle sector. In the Agenda 2000 simulation
the intervention price is decreased with 17.4% 3 and the compensation payments are in-
creased to obtain 100% compensation. Furthermore, we assume that output development
in the beef sector has a one-to-one relation with output in the cattle sector because of
complementarity in production.
- Sugar and Oilseeds:
For Oilseeds compensation payments to land are reduced by 33% and for Sugar there is
no influence from Agenda 2000.
Finally, we created a short run model by introducing sluggish primary production fac-




Figure 4.4 illustrates the Agenda 2000 effects of the price transmission mechanism as intro-
duced in section 4.3.2. The 15% reduction of the intervention price leads to a decrease of the
market price by 13.2% for foodgrains and 12.3% for feedgrains. A full price transmission is
obtained for cattle. The high degree of price transmission for grains is the result of the positive
net export position of the EU, which has even improved under the Agenda 2000 simulation,
see table 4.2. This is mainly caused by a positive output effect, see figure 4.5. For the cat-
                                                
1 With this is an approximation we abstract from the fact the dairy quota is also tied to a reference fat content of
the raw milk.
2 Hence we do not include the allocation of new specific quota to some member states. The overall quota increase
in Agenda 2000 is 2.4%, of which we only capture the linear increase of 1.5% (see also figure 4.1).
3 In the GTAP database, cattle is aggregated with other bovine animals. Because sheep represent 13% of bovine
production, the intervention price is reduced with 87%*20% = 17.4%.
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tle/beef complex the price transmission is perfect, as there continues to be massive excess
supply, which manifests itself in a positive net export position.
Figure 4.5 shows simulated Agenda 2000 effects on output and export volumes of agri-
cultural products in the EU15. Especially noteworthy are the expected positive output effects
for grains and dairy products. This positive output effect seems to run counter to intuition.
How can this be explained?
There are two elements in understanding the positive output effects: the compensation
package and the reduction of area set-aside. The income compensation to farmers which is
linked to land (or to livestock in case of cattle farming), does not induce a drop, but rather an
expansion, of production. One would expect an output decline because the compensation is
not complete, as it compensates for only about 50% of the income loss, ceteris paribus. How-
ever, an increase in cropped area is expected to lead to an expansion of output. This is a result
of the reduction of compulsory area set-aside combined with a shift of land from other sectors
(e.g. oilseeds) into grains production 1. This latter effect is due to a decline of relative profit-
ability of land in these sectors. Finally, domestic feedgrains consumption increases at the
expense of imported feedgrain substitutes, providing another boost to domestic production 2.
The dairy sector expansion follows the increase of production quota for raw milk, de-
spite a drop in prices by about 10%. Production of livestock (cattle) diminishes notably with
3%.
Figure 4.4 Price transmission between intervention and market prices under agenda 2000 (% change)
Source: Model calculations.
                                                
1 We should reiterate, however, that we did not take 'slippage effects' into account, and may therefore over-
estimate the production increase.
2 It could be instructive for a future application to numerically decompose output effects into constituent compo-
nents (lower intervention price, increase compensation payments, decrease set aside, limited price transmission
and intersectoral effects).
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Figure 4.5 Simulated agenda 2000 effects: EU output and exports, % change relative to 1995 base
Source: Model calculations.
Figure 4.6 Simulated agenda 2000 effects: EU export subsidy expenditures bounds
Source: WTO notifications, author's calculations.
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Figure 4.7 Simulated agenda 2000 effects: EU export volume bounds
Source: WTO notifications, author's calculations.
It is seen that the Agenda 2000 effect on EU export volumes is actually positive for most
products except for oilseeds, Cattle and Beef. The negative export growth in cattle and beef
corresponds straightforwardly to the intuition outlined in section 4.3.1: the decline in internal
prices stimulates domestic consumption, which reduces EU's export supply. For food- and
feedgrains the exports increase because of output increases.
Figure 4.6 and figure 4.7 show the estimated effects on the GATT export subsidy com-
mitments, both in volume terms and in budget terms. These figures show the simulated change
with respect to their year 2000 commitment levels. This reveals that the Agenda 2000 package
is expected to almost eliminate the need for export subsidies in foodgrains, hence achieving
one of the goals of this CAP reform. Substantial reduction is expected to occur for feedgrains
and beef. In the dairy sector, export subsidies will remain on the agenda 1. There is also some
reason for concern in the Other Crop, Vegetable oil, Other Meat (mainly pig and poultry meat)
and processed food products, since for these products the export subsidies commitments are
                                                
1 It should be noted that the simulation exercise only assumed an increase in production quota for raw milk, and
did not specify a fixed intervention price. This leads in the GTAP model to a simulated price change for raw milk
of about -10%, or about 2/3 of the proposed decrease of EU intervention prices. This shows that the scheduled
review of the EU dairy policy in 2003 is certainly worthwile.
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binding. With respect to export volumes, no export subsidy commitment is binding. Except for
beef, the influence of Agenda 2000 is that all products move closer to the 2000 commitments.
It is important to recognise an aggregation problem that is hunting almost all model ex-
ercises, and the present one is no exception. The movement from the commodity level (figures
4.2 and 4.3) to the more aggregate GTAP level can obscure bindings at a more disaggregated
level.
Table 4.1 shows that Agenda 2000 has rather limited effects on producers outside the
EU15. For crops, some limited negative output effects occur in those regions which directly
compete with EU15 producers, that is North America and Australia-New Zealand, while also
the regions that are geographically close to the EU, CEECs and Mediterranean countries are
somewhat affected by the output expansion in the EU grains sectors. The contraction of the
EU15 cattle/beef complex and the consequent drop of subsidised exports provides an incentive
for non-EU producers to expand production, including producers in LDCs.
Table 4.2 illustrates the changes to the bilateral trade balance between the EU15 and
other regions. For grains the bilateral trade balance for the other countries deteriorates and it
improves for the EU 1. Rather big improvements in the EU trade balance are observed for
processed food products. As this sector benefits from the use of cheaper inputs through
Agenda 2000, its domestic- and export prices are declining which in turns leads to a growth in
exports. Observe that the deterioration of the bilateral agrifood trade balances with the EU is
more than compensated by an improved trade balance in manufacturing and services.
Table 4.1 Output effects of A2000 (% change relative to 1995 base)
EU15 NorthAm AusNZL CEEC MED LDC MDC ROW
Foodgrains 2.1 -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Feedgrains 1.9 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
Oilseeds -0.6 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0
SugCB 0.5 0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0 -0.1 0
Othcrop 0.2 0 -0.1 0 0 0 0 0
Rmilk 1.5 -0.2 -1.9 -0.2 -0.3 0 -0.3 -0.8
Cattle -3 0.4 2.2 1.9 1 0.1 0.8 0.7
Othanprod 0.8 -0.2 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
Beef -3 0.4 3.9 1.3 1.5 3.3 1.2 0.8
OthMeat 0.6 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1
Dairy 1.9 -0.3 -2.5 -1.1 -1 -1.1 -0.5 -1.1
VegOil 0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
Sugar 0.4 0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0 -0.1 -0.1
ProcFood 0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Source: Model calculations.
                                                
1 As we have seen earlier, this leads to a high degree of price transmission in the EU grains sectors.
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Table 4.2 Change in bilateral trade balance with EU15 (1995 USD mln.), Agenda 2000 simulation
NorthAm AusNZL CEEC MED LDC MDC ROW
Foodgrains -39 -1 -8 -54 -52 -22 -20
Feedgrains -54 -1 -5 -24 -15 -20 -17
Oilseeds 31 0 3 2 3 16 3
Othcrop 1 0 2 1 4 -1 1
Cattle 25 1 38 53 0 3 18
Othanprod -23 -69 -15 -31 -34 -42 -70
Beef 117 260 51 129 59 495 205
OthMeat -17 -8 -41 -17 -18 -38 -83
Dairy -57 -42 -24 -75 -35 -104 -173
VegOil -10 -1 -3 -19 -31 -27 -14
Sugar 0 0 -1 -5 -5 -3 -3
ProcFood -173 -19 -50 -67 -84 -229 -295
Manu 569 31 137 247 255 325 796
Svces 178 4 11 42 26 56 128
Total 547 155 95 183 73 409 476
Trade balance with EU (initial situation)
Agrifood 2,393 2,499 -1,375 -4,921 8,707 15,362 -11,428
Total 5,660 -10,709 -11,536 -30,559 19,128 -17,187 -898
Value of exports (initial situation,
excl. intra trade)
Agrifood 62,202 20,477 6,406 8,090 37,056 70,795 18,767
Total 616,957 71,021 94,038 212,753 358,247 551,351 823,181
Source: Model calculations.
4.5.2 What if? Production-neutral reduction of set-aside in cereals
The unexpected positive output growth effect in the grains sector indicates that the increase in
area payments and/or the reduction of area set-aside are too high in relation to the reduction of
the intervention price. The height of the set-aside rate that keeps the production of food- and
feedgrains constant can be obtained by a simulation where food- and feedgrain production is
exogenously kept at pre-Agenda 2000 levels. It turns out that the reduction in the set aside rate
that keeps grain production constant is equal to 2% for foodgrains and 3.5% for feedgrains,
and therefore lower that the 5% reduction of Agenda 2000. In this case, the market price drop
is less than in the previous simulations, because the excess supply on the EU15 market (and
consequently net-exports) is reduced: a 15% reduction in the intervention price leads to a de-
crease of the market price by only 9.6% in foodgrains and 10.1% in feedgrains. The adverse
effects on the cattle/beef complex are aggregated though, due to a smaller decline in input cost
(feedgrain prices) as compared to the Agenda 2000 simulation. The compensation scheme for
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the grains sector under Agenda 2000 therefore generates indirect benefits to the cattle/beef
complex.
4.5.3 What if? Agenda 2000 under lower cereals a world prices
Simulated effects on export subsidies are contingent on assumptions on world price develop-
ments. Since the base year 1995 witnessed high international cereal prices, the export subsidy
commitment was not constraining the CAP. However, low world market prices (as in 1998/99)
immediately put upward pressure on the export subsidy budget, even if the Agenda 2000
package had been implemented. This is illustrated by conducting another experiment where, a
bumper cereals harvest in North America is simulated to occur, which leads to a drop in world
prices. It is assumed here that North American output of food- and feedgrains increases by
10% due to favourable conditions that affect total factor productivity.
The EU is assumed to implement Agenda 2000, maintains its intervention price levels,
and keeps a variable export subsidy to bridge the gap between world prices and domestic in-
tervention prices. It is seen from table 4.1 that a bumper harvest in North America limits the
reduction of the export subsidy budget that was achieved under Agenda 2000. For feedgrains
the reduction in export subsidy budget is only 17% with a bumper harvest and agenda 2000,
while it was 27% with the default Agenda 2000 assumptions. For foodgrains the reduction di-
minishes from 96 to 69%. If there is a bumper harvest, when only 75% of the price cuts of
Agenda 2000 have been effected, then there is only 9% reduction in the export subsidy budget
for feedgrains, but still 43% reduction in the export subsidy budget for foodgrains. Although
the drop in world cereal prices following the favourable harvest is of the same magnitude in
both cases, the additional budget burden for the EU is higher if the price reductions of Agenda
2000 have not been fully implemented.
Also note that the EU's policy of equal intervention prices for food- and feedgrains im-
plies a higher export subsidy for feedgrains, as there is a positive price differential between the
two on international markets. These simulations show that situations on the world market
strongly influences the export subsidy budget of the EU and therefore whether or not the ex-
port subsidy constraints may become binding. Figure 4.8 below reveals another interesting
feature of the CAP and Agenda 2000. Cereals output in third countries is very negatively af-
fected by the world price drop that follows the increased supplies from North America. The
EU15 appears to be less hurt by this, which is a consequence of the limited transmission of
world market signals to the EU15 markets. Even under Agenda 2000, the EU15 is rather ef-
fectively isolating itself from world market influences.
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Table 4.3 Changes relative to 1995 base (%) under alternative scenarios
Foodgrains Feedgrains
Full Agenda 2000 World price index (f.o.b. weights) -1 -1
Export subsidy budget -96 -27
Export volume 11 10
Change of export subsidy rate a) -12 -14
(new ad valorem % rate) (0.5) (30)
Bumper harvest World price index (f.o.b. weights) -7 -10
North America after
full implementation of Agenda 2000
Export subsidy budget -69 -17
Export volume 7 5
Change of export subsidy rate a) -9 -6
(new ad valorem % rate) (4) (39)




Export subsidy budget -43 -9
Export volume 5 3
Change of export subsidy rate a) -5 -1
(new ad valorem % rate) (7) (43)
a) This is the ordinary change of the ad-valorem subsidy rate in percentage points
Source: Model calculations.
4.6 Concluding remarks
Agenda 2000 is a small step, which is mainly directed towards alleviating future problems
with regard to EU enlargement and fulfilment of existing URAA commitments. At the same
time, Agenda 2000 sets the stage for the imminent WTO negotiations.
As far as international trade is concerned, the main effects of Agenda 2000 are expected
to occur in those markets where EU exporters face international competition from its main
competitors, i.e. North American Grains and Beef, Dairy and Beef from Australia and New
Zealand. As far as export competition is concerned, this paper shows that the Agenda 2000
package certainly continues the move in the direction of further liberalisation, with EU and
world prices of main export products moving closer towards each other. This paper also shows
that there is reason to temper the optimism. Even with the full Agenda 2000 implemented, the
successful reduction of export subsidies depends crucially on world market developments.
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The multi-sector, multi-region modelling approach employed in this paper highlights the
importance of taking into account world market linkages, even for a modest reform as Agenda
2000. The incorporation of price insulation, the sine qua non of the CAP, into the standard
GTAP framework is an important methodological contribution of this paper. Without a proper
treatment of price insulation (through intervention floor prices and variable import tariffs and
export subsidies) the EU market and world market effects of Agenda 2000 can only be imper-
fectly captured. Without fixed intervention (floor) prices incorporated into the modelling
exercise, price effects will be underestimated, especially in a constant returns GE framework.
.
Figure 4.8 Simulated effects of bumper harvest in cereals in North America: Output effects for cereals (%
change relative to 1995 base)
Source: Model calculations.
The framework employed here already incorporates some of the instruments that EU
policy makers are able to manipulate: floor prices, compensation payments and land set-aside.
A fruitful area for future research will be the modelling of endogenous bindings of export sub-
sidy constraints, which may lead to policy adjustments in 4 areas: a) formation of intervention
stocks, b) lowering intervention prices, c) measures affecting production, such as production
control (quota, set-aside) and reduction of input subsidies, and finally d) abolition of domestic
price insulation. Even without endogenous bindings, the incorporation of intervention stocks
(a) is certainly a relevant exercise, as this is an additional policy instrument available to the
EU. However, this is more relevant if the model is cast in a dynamic setting, which would also
allow for phasing of the policy package.
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Appendix 4
The 18 sectors are:
1 Foodgrains and Wheat and Rice
2 Feedgrains and Feedgrains
3 Oilseeds and Oilseeds
4 SugCB and Sugar cane, sugar beet
5 O thcrop and Other crops
6 Rmilk and Raw milk
7 Cattle and Cattle
8 Othanprod and Other animal products
9 Beef and Beef
10 OthMeat and Other meat
11 Dairy and dairy products
12 VegOil and vegetable oils and fats
13 Sugar and Sugar
14 ProcFood and Processed food
15 Extract and Natural res and extraction
16 Tex and Textiles and wearing
17 Manu and Manufacturing
18 Svces and Services
Original GTAP v4 sector New sector
pdr Paddy rice and Foodgrains
wht Wheat and Foodgrains
gro Cereal grains nec and Feedgrains
v_f Vegetables, fruit, nuts and Othcrop
osd Oil seeds and Oilseeds
c_b Sugar cane, sugar beet and SugCB
pfb Plant-based fibers and Othcrop
ocr Crops nec and Othcrop
ctl Bovine cattle, sheep and goats and Cattle
oap Animal products nec and Othanprod
rmk Raw milk and Rmilk
wol Wool silk-worm cocoons and Othanprod
for Forestry and Extract
fsh Fishing and Extract
col Coal and Extract
oil Oil and Extract
gas Gas and Extract
omn Minerals nec and Extract
cmt Bovine cattle, sheep and goat and Beef
omt Meat products nec and OthMeat
vol Vegetable oils and fats and VegOil
mil Dairy products and Dairy
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pcr Processed rice and ProcFood
sgr Sugar and Sugar
ofd Food products nec and ProcFood
b_t Beverages and tobacco products and ProcFood
tex Textiles and Tex
wap Wearing apparel and Tex
lea Leather products and Tex
lum Wood products and Manu
ppp Paper products, publishing and Manu
p_c Petroleum, coal products and Manu
crp Chemical, rubber, plastic prod and Manu
nmm Mineral products nec and Manu
i_s Ferrous metals and Manu
nfm Metals nec and Manu
fmp Metal products and Manu
mvh Motor vehicles and parts and Manu
otn Transport equipment nec and Manu
ele Electronic equipment and Manu
ome Machinery and equipment nec and Manu
omf Manufactures nec and Manu
ely Electricity and Manu
gdt Gas manufacture, distribution and Manu
wtr Water and Manu
cns Construction and Manu
t_t Trade, transport and Svces
osp Financial, business, recreatio and Svces
osg Public admin and defence, educ and Svces
dwe Dwellings and Svces
The regional aggreagtion attempts to distinguish the main trading partners of the EU and major developing
regions. The 8 regions are:
No. String
1 EU15 EU15
2 NorthAm USA and Canada
3 AusNZL Australia and New Zealand
4 CEEC Central and East European Countries
5 MED Mediterranean
6 LDC Less developed countries
7 MDC Middle develop countries
8 ROW
Original GTAP v4 region new region
AUS Australia and AusNZL
NZL New Zealand and AusNZL
JPN Japan and ROW
KOR Republic of Korea and MDC
IDN Indonesia  and LDC
MYS Malaysia and MDC
PHL Philippines and MDC
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SGP Singapore and ROW
THA Thailand and MDC
VNM Vietnam and LDC
CHN China and LDC
HKG Hong Kong and ROW
TWN Taiwan and MDC
IND India and LDC
LKA Sri Lanka and LDC
RAS Rest of South Asia and LDC
CAN Canada and NorthAm
USA United States of America and NorthAm
MEX Mexico and NorthAm
CAM Central America and Caribbean and MDC
VEN Venezuela and MDC
COL Colombia and MDC
RAP Rest of Andean Pact and MDC
ARG Argentina and MDC
BRA Brazil and MDC
CHL Chile and MDC
URY Uruguay and MDC
RSM Rest of South America and MDC
GBR United Kingdom and EU15
DEU Germany and EU15
DNK Denmark and EU15
SWE Sweden and EU15
FIN Finland and EU15
REU Rest of European Union and EU15
EFT European Free Trade Area and ROW
CEA Central European Associates and CEEC
FSU Former Soviet Union and ROW
TUR Turkey and MED
RME Rest of Middle East and MED
MAR Morocco and MED
RNF Rest of North Africa and MED
SAF South African Customs Union and MDC
RSA Rest of Southern Africa and LDC
RSS Rest of Sub Saharan Africa and LDC
ROW Rest of World and ROW
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5. Effects of a unilateral or harmonised tax on fertiliser and
pesticide use in EU agriculture
Martina Brockmeier, Josef Efken, Claudia Herok and Frank van Tongeren
5.1 Introduction 1
Within the last two decades a major shift in public perception of fertilisers and pesticides used
in agriculture has taken place. Whereas the 'green revolution' has put emphasise on higher
yields and lower unit costs due to chemical use in agriculture, public debate in most industri-
alised countries nowadays focuses on environmental and health risks which might be related
to the application of these two inputs. Consequently, some industrialised countries moved a
step further and introduced institutional restriction on chemical use in agriculture. To this
group of countries belong some member countries of the European Union (EU) as well. Does
a national restriction on chemical use in agriculture make sense within a Customs Union or
does this only produce some kind of leakage effect between member countries?
To answer this question correctly, it is necessary to calculate the benefits and risks of
fertilisers and pesticides used in agriculture on a global or regional basis. However, this is a
very comprehensive and difficult task which certainly goes beyond the scope of a so called
minor application. Nevertheless, the objective of the paper is to show how the multi-regional
general equilibrium model GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) can be adopted to make a
first step towards the analysis of restricted chemical use in agriculture. For this reason, we
firstly discuss measures and policies related to chemical use in EU agriculture (section 5.2).
Subsequently, section 5.3 presents a brief overview discussing the quantitative analysis which
can be found in the literature. Furthermore section 5.3 shortly introduces the standard GTAP
model, explains how the tax instruments can be implemented and what kind of extensions are
made to enable an analysis of restricted use of chemical agricultural inputs. In section 5.4 the
simulations are presented and results are discussed. The final section summarises the main
findings and gives some qualifications of the analysis.
5.2 Restriction on chemical use in agriculture in the EU
Chemical inputs in agriculture are mainly pesticides and fertiliser. Pesticides or plant protec-
tion agents (PPA) are utilised to protect the plants against different parasites and diseases.
They are divided into four main groups namely insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, and plant
                                                
1 The authors would like to thank Cornelia NÖTH and Rainer KLEPPER for their useful comments and support. The
usual caveats apply.
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growth regulators. Fertilisers mostly contain nitrogen, phosphorus, potash and lime (N, P, K,
Ca). PPA, but in some extent also fertilisers can eventually harm the environment and/or hu-
mans 1. An intensive use can have a negative impact like the pollution of ground and surface
water, the loss of species and the contamination of food. Both, the risks regarding the user of
agricultural chemicals and the adverse environmental and food safety effects have let to a de-
mand for regulations in most industrialised countries. Governments have therefore put into
practice regulations with regard to production, marketing, and use of chemical inputs in agri-
culture. These PPA and fertiliser policies mostly consist of two simultaneously applied
strategies (see footnote 1):
- firstly, PPA and fertilisers have to undergo detailed checks and resultant rules for usage
of PPA and fertiliser have to ensure that the correct application does not have negative
effects on the environment with exception of the desired effect;
- due to inappropriate application of chemical inputs the farmers represents themselves a
possible source of environmental hazards. Therefore, an intensive consulting and train-
ing system (e.g. Codes of Practice for the Safe Use of Pesticides) exists which protects
the user as well as the environment against harm due to misuse.
Accordingly, the use of controlled products by trained farmers should ensure that no
threat to the environment can occur. However, there are critics of this double-strategy who de-
spite education and training believe the farmer to be a factor of uncertainty and hence the
reason for too high dosages of chemical inputs. As a result some countries introduced addi-
tional non-fiscal policy instruments (see figure 5.1).
Limits related to ...
area where nutrients can be applied
amount of manure, fertiliser and mineral N
surpluses of N and P
number of livestock units per ha;
timing of manure and fertiliser application
methods of manure and fertiliser application
methods of manure storage
duration of manure storage
method of soil cultivation and land use changes
growth of catch crops and green covers in winter
Figure 5.1 Measures in EU member countries that aim at a decrease of nutrient losses in agriculture
Source: Oenema, Chardon and Ehlert: Nutrient Management Strategies Across European Agriculture
(http://www.asa-cssa-sssa.org/branch/ne/oenemapaper99. html).
                                                
1 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (2000) 'Whereas one of the most important ways of protecting plants
and plant products and of improving agricultural production is to use plant protection products; Whereas these
plant protection products can have non-beneficial effects upon plant production; whereas their use may involve
risks and hazards for humans, animals and the environment, especially if placed on the market without having
been officially tested and authorized and if incorrectly used; 'Council Directive of 15 July 1991 concerning the
placing of plant protection products on the market (91/414/EEC) http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/lif/dat/1991/en_391L0414.html
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Germany for example implemented a law that obliges farmers to set up a balance of the
main nutrients (input-output book-keeping system) which is supposed to guarantee that this
balance will not permanently be unequal.
A similar but more strict input-output system exists in the Netherlands (Dutch Ministry
of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, 2000). Besides, thresholds controlling the
maximum quantity of livestock farmers could have per hectare are implemented in Germany
and on a regional level also in the Netherlands.
Denmark: Tax on pesticides in order to reduce pesticide use; Different levels betweenproduct groups
Belgium: Tax on specific pesticides
Sweden: Tax on biocides and fertiliser incl. special cadmium tax
Finland: Tax on pesticides
Netherlands: Tax on nutrient surpluses if they exceed a levy-free surplus
Figure 5.2 Taxes on Agricultural Inputs in the European Union Member States
Source: European Commission, Database on environmental taxes in the European Union Member States plus
Norway and Switzerland (http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/enveco/env_database/database.htm).
In addition to these measures, tax instruments are discussed to internalise the negative
externality of chemical inputs in agriculture and hence to achieve a reduction in the use of fer-
tiliser and pesticides. Figure 5.2 presents an overview of taxes on chemical inputs in
agriculture of different EU member countries. It clearly shows that taxes on chemical use in
agriculture are implemented only in some EU member countries while others do not put a
limit on its use at all.
Is it efficient to implement measures and policies related to the use of chemical inputs in
agriculture at different levels in the single EU member countries? It seems to be interesting to
evaluate this issue further. For this reason we first take a closer look to the analysis of this
problem in the literature.
5.3 Adoption of the Standard GTAP Model
5.3.1 Literature on the Economic Effects of Restrictive Use of Chemicals in Agriculture
The international literature only presents a few studies on the impact of restricted use of
chemicals in agriculture. The micro-level literature arising in the late 1960s mostly deals with
new developments in integrated pest management. Here, farm cost effectiveness of alternative
pest management strategies and the issues related to market performance, pesticides resistance
and the risk and uncertainties of pesticide use on a farm level are the main topics (Lichtenberg
et al. 1990). In contrast to that, the macro-level literature of the early 1980s was initiated by
the advances in the science of toxicology as well as institutional change. Due to improved
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technological test procedures many pesticide residues with adverse effects on health were de-
tected that were considered to be negligible at the initial time of registration. In the US, the
macro-level literature on the one hand deals with problems of registration and a special review
of pesticides used in agriculture by the US Environmental Protection agency. On the other
hand, the US macro level literature focuses on the procedure 1 a pesticide must go through be-
fore registration and on the consequences of a given pesticide cancellation (Michalek, 1994,
pp. 2-3).
In Europe, a number of macro-level studies emerged when institutional restriction on the
use of pesticides were about to be introduced. However, compared to the relatively large
amount of US literature, only a very few studies were found relating the macro level effect of
certain pesticide cancellation, registration or total ban. An overview of the studies using dif-
ferent kind of models to quantify the impacts of restricted chemical use in agriculture can be
found in Hartmann and Schmitz (1992) and Michalek and Hanf (1993). National general equi-
librium models are frequently applied to analyze this issue (e.g. Komen, Oskam and Peerlings,
1997; Frandsen and Jacobsen, 1999). Only a few studies concentrate on measures described in
table one, whereas all of the studies deal with the implication of taxes on fertiliser and pesti-
cides. However, no application on the basis of a multi-regional general equilibrium model is
found in the literature. In the following it is discussed how GTAP can accommodate the analy-
sis of a restricted use of chemicals in agriculture. We start with a brief description of the
standard GTAP model and the production structure and will than focus on the implementation
of taxes on fertilisers and pesticides in the GTAP model.
5.3.2 Standard GTAP Model
The quantitative analyses in this paper is based on the GTAP model. GTAP is a comparative-
static 2 standard multi-regional model that provides an elaborate representation of the economy
including the linkages between farming, agribusiness, industrial and service sectors of the
economy. Trade is represented by bilateral trade matrices based on the Armington assumption.
The GTAP model is innovative in its treatment of private household preferences, implemented
via the non-homothetic constant difference of elasticity (CDE) functional form, the explicit
treatment of international trade and transport margins, and a global banking sector which links
global savings and consumption. Further assumptions of the standard model are perfect com-
petition in all markets as well as a profit and utility maximising behaviour of producers and
consumers. The framework of the standard GTAP model is documented in the GTAP book
(Hertel, 1997) and available on the internet.
                                                
1 As in most industrialized countries, this procedure involves a calculation of benefits and cost. The pesticide is
registered if the calculated benefit outweighs the risk caused to the environment and human health (compare also
chapter 2).
2 Most recent developments in the Global Trade Analysis Project include a dynamic version of the model. For
further information see http://www.gtap.org
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On the production side the model has a so-called 'nested structure' (see figure 5.3). It is
assumed that producers on one side decide at the boarder on the source of the intermediate in-
puts to be used in the production process. Once this decision is made, the imported input is
combined with the domestic intermediate input to form a so called composite commodity. On
the other side, the producer merge different kind of factors to constitute the value added com-
modity. Finally the producer combines value added and the composite commodity to produce
the output of a certain commodity. The theoretical framework also includes a zero profit con-
dition leading to constant return of scales.
Figure 5.3 Production structure of the standard GTAP model
Figure 5.3 also gives some information on the functional forms used in the standard
GTAP model. It can be seen that in most places a CES functional form is used. The only ex-
ception is given at the top level of the production tree. Here, value added and the composite
intermediate are combined with the help of a Leontief functional form which implies that these
two components of the production process can only be combined in fixed proportions. Under
these circumstances a tax on chemicals used in agriculture would not result in a substitution
between factors and intermediates, but only in a decrease of agricultural output. It seems to be
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clear that the production structure of the standard GTAP model needs to be adopted to ac-
commodate substitution possibilities between factors and intermediates. Before this procedure
is explained in more detail we first turn to the GTAP database to see how fertiliser and pesti-
cides are represented.
5.3.3 Pesticides and fertiliser in GTAP
In the GTAP database fertiliser and pesticides are combined with other chemical products in
one sector called chemical, rubber and plastic products. The first choice for the analysis in this
paper would be the implementation of a separate tax on fertiliser and pesticides. However, this
would require a disaggregation of the GTAP database (version 4) 1 and/or a supplement na-
tional or regional general equilibrium model 2 which goes beyond the scope of this paper. We
therefore decided to implement a tax on chemical use in agriculture in a somewhat ad hoc
manner using the existing GTAP database. Starting point is the value of domestic commodity i
purchased by sector j in region r evaluated at agents' prices (VDFAijr) and the value of im-
ported commodity i purchased by sector j in region r evaluated at agents' prices (VIFAijr) of
the GTAP database. Based on the assumption that all value flows from the chemical sector to
the agricultural sectors only consist of fertiliser and pesticides, we are able to at least identify
chemicals used in agriculture (compare table 5.1 which shows the value of VDFAijr as an ex-
ample).
Table 5.1 Value of domestic commodity i purchased by sector j evaluated at agents' prices in Denmark
Grains Oilseed Sugar cane and beet Other crops Raw milk ...
Grains 163.8 0 0 0 27.8 ...
Oilseed 0 18.2 0 0 0.1 ...
Sugar cane and beet 0 0 6.1 0 2.6 ...
Other crops 0 0 0 165.9 3.7 ...
Raw milk 0 0 0 0 803.2 ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Chemicals 91.7 7.6 4 33 52.5 ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
                                                
1 The newest version of the GTAP database is version 5. Although version 5 of the GTAP database is more di-
saggregated than version 4, it does also not differentiate between fertiliser, pesticides and other chemicals.
2 Within a two year project KO and SCHMITZ (forthcoming) disaggregated the GTAP database to differentiate
between fertiliser, pesticides and other chemicals and supplemented the GTAP model by a national general equi-
librium model.
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The GTAP database also includes the value of domestic commodity i purchased by sec-
tor j in region r evaluated at market prices (VDFMijr) and the value of imported commodity i
purchased by sector j in region r evaluated at market prices. Every difference between these
two values are due to governmental intervention and represented in the variables TFDijr =
VDFAijr/VDFMijr and TFMijr = VIFAijr/VIFMijr. These tax instrument will be used in the
simulations for the implementation of a tax on chemicals used in agriculture.
5.3.4 Extension of the standard GTAP model
In the simulation it is assumed that a decrease in the use of chemicals can be partially substi-
tuted by an increase in labour. This necessitates an expansion of the standard production
structure in the GTAP model. Here, we introduce an additional nest (see figure 5.4) which al-
lows for new substitution possibilities between unskilled labour and chemicals.
On the basis of this new production structure, the producer firstly decides again at the
boarder where to buy the imported intermediate input. As before, these imported intermediates
are then combined with domestic production to build the composite commodity. The chemical
composite commodity, however, is firstly put together with unskilled labour before this com-
bination enters the value added nest. Finally, the non-chemicals and the enlarged value added
composite form the output based on a CES functional form.
5.4 Simulations
5.4.1 Aggregation of the GTAP Database
In the simulations version 4 of the GTAP database is used that allows a maximum aggregation
of 45 regions and 50 sectors. The model aggregation used in this paper covers 10 regions with
14 sectors and highlights those agricultural sectors which apply fertiliser and pesticides (com-
pare figure 5.5).
5.4.2 Additional elasticities
According to the adopted production structure it is necessary to supplement the database with
additional elasticity's for ESUBT, ESUBCL and ESUBCLI. These elasticities are responsible
for the substitution possibilities within the new nest. We also relax the strong assumption im-
plied by the Leontief functional form of the standard GTAP model at the top level of the
production tree (compare figure 5.4).
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Figure 5.4 Adopted production structure
Here, a CES functional form is used that requires additional values as well. It would be
desirable to estimate these parameters econometrically as they are crucial for the simulations.
However, for this demonstrative application it would be too much of an effort, so that we
adopted the values from the literature (compare table 5.2). For the substitution elasticity's at
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bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horse meat products, meat products
nec, wool, silk-worm cocoons, animal products nec
Sugar
Other Food Products
processed rice, vegetable oils and fats, food products nec,
beverages and tobacco products
Fishing
Other Primaries
forestry, coal, oil, gas, minerals nec
Chemicals
Manufactures
textiles, wearing apparel, leather products, wool products, paper
products, publishing, petroleum, coal products, mineral products
nec, ferrous metals, metals nec, metal products, motor vehicles and
parts, transport equipment nec, electronic equipment, machinery
and equipment nec, manufactures nec, electricity, gas manufacture,
distribution, water, construction
Services
trade, transport, financial, business, recreational services
public administration and defense, education, health, dwellings
Figure 5.5 Aggregation of the GTAP database (version 4)
5.4.3 Other specific data
Due to its specific relevance for the analysis of environmental taxes we have to take a deeper
look into the 'chemicals' sector. As explained in section 5.3, the chemical sector includes fer-
tiliser and pesticides used in agricultural production. For a separate evaluation of those two
components additional information about the regional as well as sectoral distribution of pesti-
cides and fertiliser is needed. These data were taken from other surveys and studies (EFMA
(1997), Eurostat (1995), Jacob (2000) compare table A1.1-A1.4 in the appendix to this chap-
ter).
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Table 5.2 Additional elasticity's for the extended production structure
Elasticity of Substitution Value
ESUBCL (all products except capital goods) 0.50
ESUBCL (capital goods) 0
ESUBCLI (all products except capital goods) 0.25
ESUBCLI (capital goods) 0
Source: Adopted from Frandsen and Jacobsen (1999).
5.4.4 Scenarios
The GTAP version 4 database does not provide information about taxes on fertiliser and pesti-
cides, e.g. all values of TFDijr and TFMijr are equal to one. For this reason it is necessary to
update the GTAP version 4 database somehow before running actual simulations. In doing
this, the most recent information about taxes concerning the use of chemicals in the European
Union is implemented. Here we used the OECD database on environmentally related taxes,
fees and charges levied in OECD member countries. Information in this database has been
provided by contact persons in the respective countries (e.g. ministries of finance and minis-
tries of environment. The base year of this database is 1995, but there are estimates on
environmentally related tax revenues for 1999 included as well (compare
http://www.autoeval.com).
Table 5.3 Taxes on fertiliser and pesticides in the EU (power of the ad valorem tax)
Pesticides Fertiliser
Denmark 1.25 to 1.35 -
Finland 1.35 1.35
Sweden 1.40 -
Source: OECD database on environmentally related taxes (2000). http://www.autoeval.com.
This information is utilised in a preliminary simulation to update version 4 of the GTAP
database 1. The resulting updated data representing the most recent information on taxes on
fertiliser and pesticides was than used as base data in the following simulations. According to
                                                
1 Beside the information given in table 5.3, the database of the OECD also provides two other kind of data which
could not be utilized for an update because the concerning countries are included in the composite region Rest of
the EU 15. These are information on taxes imposed in the Netherlands beyond a certain minimum threshold of
surplus nitrogen and phosphate and a tax on pesticide in Belgium.
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the idea of a harmonisation of 'environmental' taxes across the EU and based on the existing
tax rates four different scenarios were developed for the analysis:
- Scenario 1:
Harmonisation of taxes on fertiliser and pesticides on the highest level (TFDijr = TFMijr
= 1.40) in all member countries (SIM1)
- Scenario 2:
Harmonisation of taxes on fertiliser and pesticides on a level that lies in-between (TFDijr
= TFMijr = 1.20) in all member countries (SIM2)
- Scenario 3:
Reduction of taxes on fertiliser and pesticides to the lowest level (TFDijr = TFMijr =
1.00) in all member countries (SIM3)
- Scenario 4:
Harmonisation of taxes on fertiliser and pesticides (TFDijr = TFMijr = 1.40) in all 
Scandinavian countries of the EU (SIM4)
The results of these simulation will be presented in the following sections.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Agricultural output
Figure 5.6 shows the percentage change of agricultural output of the EU as a whole. Due to
the increase in taxes on chemicals in scenario 1 and 2 the agricultural producers in the EU,
with the exception of some Scandinavian countries, face augmenting production costs. This
leads to a decrease in agricultural output. The largest effect can be observed in the oilseeds
sector with a decline of 5.8% in scenario 1 respectively 4.2% in scenario 2, followed by the
production of grains and sugar. In scenario 3 slight increase of agricultural production can be
observed, whereas the opposite is given for scenario 4.
This result is driven by the change of agricultural output in countries where the tax is in-
creased due to the harmonisation. As an example figure 5.7 shows the change in agricultural
output in Germany in all four simulations. Here, it can be seen, that the higher tax leads to a
reduction of agricultural output in a similar range. Figure 5.8 shows the change in agricultural
output in Sweden as an example for a country where the taxes on chemicals are decreased or
stayed unchanged in simulation 1 to 3. It is more or less the mirror image of the effects given
in figure 5.6. The more taxes on chemicals are decreased the more the Swedish agricultural
output is increased. However, as the agricultural output of the Scandinavian countries is only
small compared to the remaining part of the EU, agricultural output for the whole region in
figure 5.6 shows a decrease.
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Figure 5.6 Change in agricultural output in the European Union (in %)
5.5.2 Change in volume of fertiliser and pesticides
Figure 5.9 presents the change in the volume of fertiliser and pesticides in the EU. The calcu-
lations of these changes are based on the assumption that the percentage change of chemical
used in agriculture is equal for all fertiliser and pesticides 1. It can clearly be seen that there is
a significant reduction in nitrogen, phosphate, and potassium in scenario 1 and 2 which fol-
lows the decrease in agricultural production within the EU, though the use of unskilled labor is
intensified in those countries which suffer from a higher tax on chemicals. In contrast to that
the decrease in pesticides is more or less negligible.
                                                
1 The total amount of nitrogen, phosphate, potassium and pesticides is multiplied by the percentage change of
chemicals used in agriculture derived by the GTAP model.
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Figure 5.7 Change in agricultural output in Germany (in %)
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Figure 5.8 Change in agricultural output in Sweden (in %)
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Figure 5.9 Change in volume of fertiliser and pesticides used in EU-15 countries (in t active ingredient)
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Figure 5.10 Change in volume of fertiliser and pesticides used in Sweden (in t active ingredient)
Figure 5.10 shows the change in the volume of fertiliser and pesticides of Sweden which
is again a mirror image of the EU. The increase in the use of nitrogen, phosphate and potas-
sium is the higher, the higher the reduction in tax on chemicals and the increase in agricultural
production. The mirror image is given for those countries where an increase in tax on chemi-
cals used in agriculture is given (not shown).
5.5.3 Trade effects
As an example for the main trend concerning trade figure 5.11 shows the change in the value
of grain exports from Sweden to the other EU member countries. Similar results are obtained
for oilseeds, sugar crops and other crops (not shown). It is obvious that the Swedish exports of
crops to other EU member countries and the Rest of the World (ROW) mainly increase in the
simulations where the tax on fertilisers and pesticides is increased in the importing countries
(SIM 1 - SIM 3). At the same time the imports of grains from other EU member countries de-
creases (compare figure 5.12). Apparently, Sweden has a competitive advantage, when the tax
on chemicals is extended in other member countries.
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Figure 5.11 Change in the value of grain exports from Sweden (in %)
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Figure 5.12 Change in the value of grain imports into Sweden (in %)
Figure 5.12 also shows that the increase of taxes on fertilisers and pesticides within a
sub-region of the EU, namely Scandinavia, creates a leakage effect (SIM 4), as imports of
crops from ROW and other member countries with the exception of Finland and Denmark are
raised.
5.6 Conclusion
- The GTAP model is capable of assessing the effects of a tax on fertiliser and pesticides.
However, it is necessary to greatly supplement the GTAP database both with data on
fertiliser and pesticides as well as with information on tax related to chemicals used in
agriculture.
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- Taxes on fertiliser and pesticides do not effect the other sectors in the economy in EU
member countries as well as the whole economy in third countries very much. With the
use of a multi-regional general equilibrium model it can nevertheless be shown that a tax
on fertiliser and pesticides within one country of a customs union creates some kind of
leakage effect.
- The most critical aspect in the analysis is the aggregation of the GTAP database for fer-
tiliser and pesticides. To get more reliable results it would be most desirable to
disaggregate the sector called 'chemicals' into sub-sectors for all regions of the GTAP
database or to have more reliable input shares for fertiliser and pesticides. This way, the
taxes on fertiliser and pesticides could be implemented more efficiently. In addition the
results would be much more exact.
- Furthermore, the substitution elasticity's in the production structure may reveal the ad
hoc manner in which the production structure is installed. An econometric estimate or at
least a sensitivity analysis for these parameters would help to improve the analysis.
- In summing up, it is necessary to note that GTAP does have the potential to carry out the
analysis of a tax on fertiliser and pesticides on a global basis, if the model is slightly
adopted and the database is supplemented. As agricultural policy is represented in a very
stylised way in this paper, it would be an interesting extension of this paper to consider
the explicit interaction of agricultural an environmental policy in more detail.
107
References
Armington, P., 'A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of Origin'. In: In-
ternational Monetary Fund Staff Papers vol. 16 (1969) S. 159 - 178.
Council of the European Communities (2000) Council Directive of 15 July 1991 concerning
the placing of plant protection products on the market (91/414/EEC)
http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/lif/dat/1991
Dutch Ministry of Agriculture Nature Management and Fisheries (2000): Policy document on
Manure and Ammonia http://www.minlnv.nl/internatio-nal/policy/environ/
EFMA, Forecast of Fertiliser Consumption in EFMA Countries to 2006/7, 1997.
European Commission (2000), Database on environmental taxes in the European Union Mem-
ber States plus Norway and Switzerland http://europa.eu.int/
comm/envionment/enveco/env_database/database.html
Eurostat, SPEL-Database, Luxembourg, 1995.
Frandsen, S.E. and Jacobsen, L.-B., Is a Unilateral Danish Ban on Pesticides Costly? Model-
ling Technological Shifts and Data Requirements. Paper prepared for the Second Annual
Conference on Global Economic Analysis, June 20-22, Denmark, 1999.
Hertel, T.W. (ed.), Global Trade Analysis: Modelling and Applications. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1997.
Jacob, L., The consumption of crop protection chemicals in the European Union. European
Crop Protection Association (ECPA). Brussels, 2000.
Lichtenberg, E., Zilberman, D. and Archibald, S.O., 'Economics and Pesticides'. In: Zilber-
mann, D. and Siebert, J.B. (eds.) Economic Perspective of Pesticides Use in California.
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Division of Agriculture and Natural Re-
sources. University of California, working paper no. 564 (1990) pp. 78-102.
108
Komen, M.H.C., Oskam, A.J. and Peerlings, J., 'Effects of Reduced Pesticide Application for
the Dutch Economy'. In: A.J. Oskam and R.A.N. Vijftigschild, Policy Measures to Control
Environmental Impacts from Agriculture, Wageningen Agricultural University, 1997.
Michalek, J., 'Macro Models Used for an Evaluation of the Effects of Changed Polices on
Pesticide Use'. In: Michalek, J. and Hanf, C.-H. (eds.), The Economic Consequences of a
Drastic Reduction in Pesticide Use in the EU, Wissenschaftsverlag Vauk Kiel KG, 1994.
Michalek, J. and Hanf C.-H. (eds.), The Economic Consequences of a Drastic Reduction in
Pesticide Use in the EU, Wissenschaftsverlag Vauk Kiel KG, 1994.
Oenema, O., Chardon, W. and Ehlert, P., Nutrient Management Strategies Across European
Agriculture. http://www.as-cssa-sssa.org/branch/ ne/oenemapaper99.htlm, 2000.
Schmitz, P.M and Hartmann, M., (eds.), Landwirtschaft und Chemie, Wissenschaftsverlag
Vauk Kiel KG, 1993.
Schmitz, P.M. and Ko, J.H. (forthcoming), Analysis of Pesticides Policies in Germany using a
CGE Model. Working Paper Agribusiness Research No. 15, Gießen.
109
Appendix 5
Table A1.1 Amount of fertiliser used in different crops in the EU 1995/96 (in 1000t)
Cereals Oilseeds
 
N P K Total N P K Total
D 868 200 272 1,340 115 38 78 231
DK 168 31 59 258 14 2 5 21
S 100 21 12 133 6 3 2 11
SF 81 36 34 151 7 2 2 11
UK 532 170 184 886 69 20 18 107
Rest of EU 2,754 1,166 816 4,736 166 130 172 468
EU-15 4,503 1,624 1,377 7,504 377 195 277 849
Sugar crops Other Crops
 
N P K Total N P K Total
D 66 36 77 179 720 126 222 1,068
DK 8 3 4 15 101 13 30 144
S 6 3 4 13 85 23 34 142
SF 4 3 2 9 91 31 47 169
UK 21 8 19 48 706 191 252 1,149
Rest of EU 157 95 155 407 2,739 1,199 1,715 5,653
EU-15 262 148 261 671 4,442 1,583 2,300 8,325
Source: EFMA (1997).
Table A1.2 Consumption of pesticides used in different crops in the EU 1995/96 (in t active ingredient)
D DK S SF UK Rest of EU-15 EU-15
Total
Cereals 16,533 1,980 439 300 8,802 43,682 71,736
Oilseeds 1,180 35 20 8 459 4,954 6,656
Sugar 1,893 299 147 94 828 6,049 9,310
Others 5,898 640 137 62 2,013 151,693 160,443
Source: Jacob (2000).
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Table A1.3 Value of fertiliser used in different crops in the EU 1995/96 (in million ECU)
Cereals Oilseeds
 
N P K Total N P K Total
D 511 130 92 734 68 25 27 119
DK 100 24 19 143 8 2 2 11
S 57 15 4 76 3 2 1 6
SF 35 21 21 77 3 1 1 5
UK 284 78 62 423 37 9 6 52
Rest of EU 1,553 750 269 2,572 94 84 57 234
EU-15 2,540 1,018 467 4,025 213 122 93 428
Sugar crops Other Crops
 
N P K Total N P K Total
D 39 23 26 88 424 82 75 581
DK 5 2 1 8 60 10 10 80
S 3 2 1 7 49 16 12 76
SF 2 2 1 5 39 18 29 86
UK 11 4 6 21 376 87 84 548
Rest of EU 89 61 51 201 1,545 771 565 2,881
EU-15 149 94 88 330 2,493 985 775 4,253
Source: EFMA (1997), Eurostat (1995).
Table A1.4 Value of pesticides used in different crops in the EU 1995/96 (in million ECU)
D DK S SF UK Rest of EU-15 EU-15
Total
Cereals 340.9 61.3 34.7 23.5 261.2 506.5 1,228.1
Oilseeds 92.6 6.8 4.0 4.3 54.7 235.2 397.6
Sugar 62.5 5.2 3.9 3.3 41.3 130.2 246.4
Others 209.8 51.1 6.0 8.2 261.7 1,460.4 1,997.1
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